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Introduction
Nowadays, the influence of the price of crude oil on the world economy is
indisputable.
As reported by the US Department of Energy Information Administration
(EIA), in 2017 the total crude oil consumption amounted to 35.9 billion bar-
rels of oil, and the North Sea Brent crude oil spot prices averaged 54 dollars
per barrel.
As a result, the overall oil market size reached 1.9 trillion dollars in the previ-
ous year.
Given the growing flow of money into the crude oil market, understanding the
economic factors behind oil price movements provides a useful content resource
for institutional and private organizations.
For example, central banks can take accurate actions with respect to mon-
etary policy, while private companies can provide more reliable budgets for
businesses strategies.
The international market for crude oil involves a pool of traders from different
countries around the world and it includes spot and forward markets. The for-
mer generally refers to a short-term commodity transaction where the barrels
of oil change hands very quickly after the sellers receive payment. The latter
consists of contracts through which oil traders agree up-front on a price for a
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certain amount of oil barrels that will be delivered to a specific location in the
future.
Given the large number of participants in oil markets, it is widely accepted
that the price of oil is being determined by worldwide supply-and-demand.
The empirical specifications for modelling the price of oil can be divided into
two groups: financial and economic fundamentals models. The former inves-
tigate the relationship between spot and futures prices in the forward market,
whereas the latter analyse the role of aggregate variables to capture the pecu-
liar characteristics of the physical market.
A common practice among researchers is to consider the endogeneity of the
price of oil with respect to the economy. In economic fundamentals models, the
first analysis to take up this feature is a study by Kilian (2009). The author
introduces a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model for the global
market for crude oil, which represents a novelty in terms of methodology and
results.
The SVAR model is based on monthly past data on three aggregate variables:
global oil production, a measure for real economic activity and the real price
of crude oil. The main finding of this study is that shocks to demand and/or
supply have a different impact on the real price of oil.
A revised version of this model is discussed by Kilian and Murphy (2014) and
Kilian and Lee (2014), where the authors include a proxy for above-ground oil
inventories to capture the forward looking behaviours of oil traders.
My dissertation, “Essays on the global oil market” adds to the above literature,
by presenting new empirical evidence. The first chapter of the thesis, “Mod-
elling the global price of oil: is there any role for the oil futures-spot spread?”
proposes an analysis of the global market for crude oil based on the revised
version of the SVAR model introduced by Kilian and Murphy (2014).
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The interesting feature of this model for the context presented above is that it
captures the forward-looking expectations of oil traders by replacing a physi-
cal proxy for crude oil inventories above the ground with a financial measure,
namely the oil futures-spot spread.
The second chapter, “Interpreting the oil risk premium: do oil price shocks
matter?”, focuses instead on the impact of oil price shocks on the crude oil risk
premium. The latter refers to the average returns that long-investors expect to
receive as a monetary reward for non-diversifiable risk in the crude oil market.
Both works focus on the global market for crude oil: while the first chapter
studies the main economic and financial factors behind changes in the real
price of oil on the basis of the theory of storage, the second chapter investi-
gates the effects of oil price shocks on the crude oil risk premium based on the
theory of normal backwardation. Although these two economic theories are
not mutually exclusive, the former focuses on the role of the convenience yield
(a measure of the tightness of the physical spot oil market) while the latter
emphasizes the interaction between hedgers and speculators.
In other words, the first chapter treats the oil futures-spot spread as a proxy
for the convenience yield but expressed with an opposite sign. The oil futures-
spot spread is observable and establishes a link between oil futures prices and
current oil spot prices.
The second chapter provides interesting results for the crude oil risk premium,
defined as the expected component of the difference between the oil future spot
price and the current oil futures price.
One might think to include a proxy for the convenience yield to investigate
the effects of oil prices shocks on the crude oil risk premium. This is not nec-
essary for at least two reasons. First, understanding how unexpected oil price
changes might affect the risk premium requires the identification of three main
3
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structural shocks, that is shocks to oil production (supply shocks), shocks to
the global business cycle (aggregate demand shocks) and shocks to the price
of crude oil (precautionary demand shocks). The latter, according to Kilian
(2009) and Alquist and Kilian (2010), provide evidence of unexpected changes
in the convenience yield, therefore the exclusion of the oil futures-spot spread
(or above-ground crude oil inventories) as a measure of the storage market
does not invalidate the present investigation.
Second, given the difficulty of interpreting the results economically, as the
number of endogenous variables increases it is best to propose the most parsi-
monious specification of the model. The first chapter of my dissertation brings
three main elements of novelty to the existing literature.
First, as opposed to traditional oil market VAR models, I glean the expecta-
tions of forward-looking traders from the crude oil futures market by replacing
the proxy for global above-ground crude oil inventories with the oil futures-
spot spread.
This represents the simplest way to establish a direct link between physical
and financial markets within the context of the SVAR model. Therefore, the
inclusion of the oil-futures spot spread in the set of endogenous variables ad-
dresses some practical issues.
The first concern is to construct a reliable measure that aggregates crude oil
stocks stored anywhere on Earth. The second issue refers to the lack of infor-
mation induced by the incentive to hide some of the crude oil stored for each
country. Conversely, the oil futures-spot spread represents a measure that is
available in real time and is not subject to revisions.
Second, I propose an economic interpretation of a new structural shock, namely
the financial market shock, which is designed to capture a change in the ben-
efit of holding crude oil inventories for reasons not already indicated by the
4
previous three structural shocks of the model.
For example, an unexpected positive financial market shock might be driven
by a speculative purchase of oil futures contracts, arbitrage mechanisms used
to restore the equilibrium between financial and physical markets, and other
forms of incentives that are implemented to keep crude oil off the physical
market, causing the spot price of oil to rise.
Third, I highlight the main interesting features of five structural oil market
VAR models and the implied identification structures. In addition I propose
a simple qualitative method to rank SVAR models of interest on the basis of
their impulse response functions.
The main results of the first chapter show that the SVAR model with oil
futures-spot spread produces consistent impulse response estimates that are
qualitatively similar to analogous studies. On average, shocks to aggregate
and residual demands represent the most important drivers in explaining the
fluctuation in oil futures-spot spread and real price of oil, respectively.
I find that aggregate demand shocks caused an increase in the price of oil
between 2003 and 2008, and that positive financial market shocks also con-
tributed significantly to the increase in oil prices.
This analysis illustrates that between 2002 and 2006 the increase in the oil
futures-spot spread, associated with a reduction of the convenience yield, due
to inventory build-up, was followed by a rise in the real price of oil.
Finally, a qualitative comparison among different SVAR models of the mar-
ket for crude oil shows two main findings. First, all of these models are well
designed to capture shocks to the demand for crude oil that are triggered by
unanticipated changes in the global business cycle. This confirms the role
played by aggregate demand shocks, in accordance with Kilian (2009) and Kil-
ian and Murphy (2014). Second, alternative methods of identification based on
5
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relaxing zero-restrictions improve the accuracy of impulse response functions,
providing a clearer explanation for the transmission of structural shocks to the
price of oil.
The second chapter of my thesis adds new evidence to empirical literature
on the effects of oil price shocks on the crude oil risk premium. The main
research question I aim at answering is whether compensation for risk depends
on the type of structural shock in question. In particular: what is the rela-
tionship between crude oil risk premium and unexpected rise in the price of
oil? On average, what should speculators expect to receive as compensation
for the risk they are taking on?
To conduct this analysis, I apply a revised version of the SVAR model of
the crude oil market as proposed by Baumeister and Hamilton (2017). The
methodology allows us to deal with reverse causality and consider the endo-
geneity of the crude oil risk premium with respect to macroeconomic and global
oil market variables.
The main results stemming from the analysis of the dynamic responses suggest
the existence of a negative relationship between the impact responses of the
price of oil and the risk premium to shocks of economic fundamentals in the
global oil market.
This finding is consistent with the theoretical framework based on the hedging
pressure theory, limits to the arbitrage theory and further considerations that
will be presented and discussed in this dissertation.
In conclusion, this analysis shows that the historical decline of the risk pre-
mium could be modelled as a part of the endogenous effect of shocks to the
fundamentals of the global market for crude oil as suggested by Kilian and Lee
(2014).
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Chapter 1
Modelling the global price of oil:
is there any role for the oil
futures-spot spread?
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Modelling the global price of oil: is there any role for
the oil futures-spot spread?
Daniele Valenti
Abstract
In this paper we develop a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model of the
global market for crude oil where the forward-looking expectations of oil traders are
inferred from the financial markets. Thus, we replace the global proxy for above-
ground crude oil inventories with the oil futures-spot spread. The latter is defined
as the percent deviation of the oil futures price from the spot price of oil and it
represents a measure of the convenience yield but expressed with an opposite sign.
The following model provides an economic interpretation of the residual structural
shock, namely the financial market shock. This is designed to capture an unantici-
pated change in the benefit of holding crude oil inventories that is driven by financial
incentives. We find evidence that financial market shocks have played an important
role in explaining the surge of the real price of oil during the period 2003-2008. We
also highlight the main interesting features of five structural oil market VAR models
and their implied identification structures. In addition we propose a simple quali-
tative method to rank different oil market VAR models. The comparative analysis
offers evidence that the oil futures-spot spread represents a proper measure to cap-
ture the forward looking expectations of oil traders.
Keywords: Global market for crude oil; Bayesian SVAR model; Oil futures-spot
spread; Oil price speculation
JEL Codes: Q40 ,Q41, Q43, E32
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1.1 Introduction
In this analysis, we evaluate the importance of financial forces in driving
the real price of crude oil, by relying on a sign-restricted SVAR model. It
is widely accepted that crude oil represents the most important and traded
commodity in the world.
As reported by the US Department of Energy Information Administration
(EIA), in 2017 the total crude oil consumption amounted to 35.9 billion bar-
rels of oil, and the North Sea Brent crude oil spot prices averaged 54 dollars
per barrel 1. As a result, the overall oil market size reached 1.9 trillion dollars
in the previous year. Due to the growing flow of money into the global crude
oil market, 2 understanding the economic factors behind oil price movements
provides a useful content resource for policy makers and private organizations.
For example, central banks can take accurate actions with respect to monetary
policy, while private companies can provide more reliable budgets for business
strategies. In this work, we propose an analysis of the global market for crude
oil based on a revised version of the SVAR model introduced by Kilian and
Murphy (2014).
Our study widens the extant literature on modelling the global price of crude
oil at least in three directions. First, as opposed to traditional oil market VAR
1The spot price is the price at which the barrel of crude oil is immediately available in a
given region. The Brent spot price is produced in the North Sea region while the WTI spot
price is sent via pipeline to Cushing (Oklahoma).
2The global crude oil market includes spot and forward markets. The spot market gen-
erally refers to a short-term commodity transaction where the barrels of oil change hands
very quickly after the sellers receive payment. Typically, spot sales are surpluses or amounts
that a producer has not committed to sell on a term basis. Buyers may also have under-or
over-estimated their consumption and may have oil surpluses to sell or shortages. Most of
the crude oil traded in the physical markets is usually decided in advance by stipulating one
year term agreements. According to Smith (2009) only a small fraction of the total physical
trading (5-10%) represents a spot deal between two counterparts. The forward market con-
sists of contracts through which oil traders agree up-front on a price for a certain amount
of oil barrels that will be delivered to a specific location in the future. Futures price is the
price at which the commodity will be available for delivery at a specified future date and
place.
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models, we retrieve the expectations of forward-looking traders from the crude
oil futures markets by replacing the proxy for global above-ground crude oil
inventories with the oil futures-spot spread. The latter, defined as the percent
deviation of the oil futures price from the spot price of crude oil, is a proxy for
the convenience yield but expressed with an opposite sign.
In general, some OECD countries do not provide reliable and regular estimates
about their level of inventories and data collections from non-OECD economies
are publicly unavailable. In this context the aggregation of world crude oil in-
ventories is a big challenge.
To solve this issue, Kilian and Murphy (2014) introduce a proxy for the global
above-ground crude oil stocks by multiplying data of the US crude oil inven-
tories and the ratio between the OECD and the US petroleum stocks. 3
As pointed out by Kilian and Lee (2014) this proxy fails to take into account
the existence of crude oil inventory stored at sea, in transit via pipelines, in
the oil tankers and most important in those countries outside OECD regions.
Moreover, even if the most accurate proxy for global crude oil inventories was
available it would not address the question of how to deal with the lack of
information induced by the incentive to hide some of the crude oil stored in
each country.
The oil futures-spot spread can be used to deal with these issues by offering a
reliable measure of the benefit of having ready access to crude oil stocks, any-
where they might be. There are several reasons to include the oil futures-spot
spread in this analysis.
First, it is available in real time and is not subject to revisions as opposed to
a proxy for global crude oil inventories. Second, the oil futures-spot spread
3Data for petroleum stocks are provided by the EIA and it includes crude oil as well
as strategic petroleum reserves (SPR), unfinished oils, natural gas plant liquids and refined
products.
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is simple to derive and represents a reliable global market value of storage.
Third, the crude oil futures contract with maturity 3-months ensures both the
arbitrage-free hypothesis and the forward-looking property of the analysis 4.
As a result, the inclusion of the oil futures-spot spread represents the simplest
way to establish a direct link between physical and financial markets within
the context of the SVAR model.
The second contribution of this paper consists of the economic interpretation
of the residual structural shock, namely the financial market shock. The lat-
ter can be derived from the combination between the oil futures-spot spread
and a specific set of sign restrictions imposed on the elements of the impact
multiplier matrix.
According to the theory of storage, we show that a positive financial market
shock reflects an increase in the crude oil futures price relative to the current
spot price. This shock drives up the residual demand for crude oil causing
the amount of oil-stocks to build-up for reasons not already indicated by the
previous three structural shocks of the model.
For example, an unexpected positive financial market shock might be driven
by a speculative purchase of oil futures contracts, arbitrage mechanisms used
to restore the equilibrium between financial and physical markets, and other
forms of incentives that are implemented to keep crude oil off the physical
market, causing the spot price of oil to rise.
Finally, this work highlights the main interesting features of five SVAR mod-
4 It is not surprising that a variety of investors trade paper barrels to exploit facilities in
terms of cost-efficient trading, risk management opportunities and oil price discovery. Paper
barrels consist of forward contracts which are traded by hedgers and speculators in an anony-
mous auction through futures brokers. These contracts do not require a physical delivery
of the commodity. The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the Intercontinental
Exchange (ICE) represent the two most important energy derivatives exchanges for futures,
swap and options contracts. Trading is made only for speculation or hedging purposes and
these instruments are typically closed out (or rolled over) before their expires dates. In other
words in these markets it is not necessary to take the delivery of the commodity.
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els for the analysis of the global market for crude oil. We proceed as follow.
Firstly, for each specification we provide the economic interpretation of the
related identification structure with reference to the implied elasticity of oil
demand and oil supply. Secondly, we carry on a pairwise comparison of the
benchmark SVAR model 5 and the other specifications. The comparative anal-
ysis is based on the impulse responses of the real price of oil and forward-looking
variables to each structural shock. Finally, we rank the oil market VAR models
according to the accuracy of the impact responses and the plausible values of
elasticities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the literature
review. Section 1.3 describes the dataset and provides empirical evidence of
the relationship between crude oil spot prices and oil futures-spot spread. Sec-
tion 1.4 discusses the econometric method. Section 1.5 illustrates the empirical
results. Section 1.6 provides a comparison and a rank of the benchmark SVAR
model and other specifications proposed in this analysis. Finally sections 1.7
and 1.8 offer some robustness checks and conclusions, respectively.
5The benchmark SVAR model refers to the oil market VAR model with oil futures spot
spread proposed in section 1.4.
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1.2 Literature review
The empirical literature on modelling the price of oil is based on financial
and economic fundamentals models. The former investigate the relationship
between oil spot and futures prices in the forward market. The latter emphasise
the role of the real aggregate variables 6 to capture the peculiar characteristics
of the physical market for crude oil.
In most of the cases the above mentioned models are reduced-form econometric
approaches grounded on the economic theory.
Some pioneering articles of the theory of storage are studies of Kaldor (1939);
Working (1949); Telser (1958) and Brennan (1958). All of these works postu-
late that, in the short run, rational economic agents can affect the spot and
the futures prices of oil by means of their optimal inventories holding. Pindyck
(1994, 2001) points out the strategic importance for companies to have ready
access to oil stocks. This provides an efficient way to smooth consumption (or
production) and to minimise adjustment and marketing costs incurred in the
oil industry.
Numerous studies investigate the main economic and financial factors that
affect the global price of crude oil, see Hamilton (2009a,b); Smith (2009); Fat-
touh et al. (2013); Knittel and Pindyck (2016). These works do not find that
financial speculation caused an increase in the spot price of oil, during the
period 2003-2008.
For example, Knittel and Pindyck (2016) develop an equilibrium model, de-
scribing the relationship between the cash and storage market, to investigate
whether the impact of oil price speculation is consistent with data on produc-
tion, inventory changes, spot and futures prices. Given reasonable assumptions
6We refer to aggregate variables such as: the world oil-stock (industrial and government
oil inventory levels), global production, consumption and real price of crude oil.
15
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about elasticities of oil supply and demand, they conclude that speculation has
not played a relevant role in the sharp increase in oil-prices since 2004.
A recent empirical work proposed by Miao et al. (2017) provides an important
contribution to the investigation of the impact of crude oil inventory announce-
ments on derivatives prices. The authors find out that oil futures and options
prices respond in a manner that seems to anticipate changes in oil inventory
levels.
A common practice among researchers is to consider the endogeneity of the
price of oil with respect to the economy, as discussed in Kilian and Lutkepohl
(2016). This implies that the real price of oil is being determined by worldwide
supply-and-demand. The first analysis to take up this feature is a study by
Kilian (2009). The author introduces a SVAR model for the global market for
crude oil, which represents a novelty in terms of methodology and results. The
model of interest includes monthly past data on three aggregate variables: the
growth rate of global crude oil production, a measure of real economic activity
based on the cost of shipping in the international commodity markets and the
global real price of crude oil. 7
The econometric approach is based on the idea that real price of crude oil is
mainly determined by structural shocks associated with a global supply of oil,
a world demand for industrial commodities and an oil market specific demand
(or precautionary demand shock). The main finding of this work is that shocks
to demand and/or supply have a different impact on the real price of oil.
Kilian and Murphy (2012) investigate the roles of the structural shocks on the
real price of crude oil by relaxing the zero-restrictions assumptions postulated
by Kilian (2009). For the identification of the structural shocks, the authors
7We consider the US refiners’ imported acquisition cost (RACi) as a proxy for the spot
price in the global market for crude oil. This is available from the web-site of the EIA. For
the sake of clarity, in this analysis the terms “spot price of oil” and “real price of oil” are
treated as synonyms, unless otherwise specified.
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develop a Bayesian SVAR model based on a set of sign restrictions imposed on
the elements of the impact multiplier matrix. This analysis provides empirical
results that are consistent with the narrative in Kilian (2009).
Lutkepohl and Netsunajev (2014) investigate the causal relationship among
world oil production, real economic activity and real price of oil by exploiting
heteroskedasticity of the data, for the identification of the shocks.
For this purpose, the authors use a Markov Switching VAR model (MS-VAR)
to construct impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompo-
sition. They find out that oil supply shocks have little explanatory power for
the changes in the real price of crude oil and the aggregate demand shocks
have become less important to explain the variability of oil prices, since the
mid 1980s.
A work by Baumeister and Peersman (2013) investigates the dynamic change
of the structural forces of the global oil market by exploiting a Bayesian time-
varying parameter vector autoregressive model (TVP-VAR) with stochastic
volatility in the innovation process.
Their results suggest that the reduction of price elasticity of oil demand and
supply represents the main reason behind the recent increase in oil price volatil-
ity. In other words, the authors state that the slope of the demand and supply
curves have become so steeper that even small perturbations on either side
of the market, have caused large changes in price of oil followed by modest
variation in their quantities.
Early analysis based on SVAR models have three features in common. First,
they include the same set of variables proposed in Kilian (2009). Second, they
show that unanticipated shocks to demand for crude oil are the most impor-
tant drivers in explaining the fluctuations in the price of oil. Third, the implied
structural models do not include a proxy for the forward looking behaviour of
17
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oil traders. In this case global oil market VAR models could fail to identify
the speculative component 8. Therefore, Kilian and Murphy (2014) introduce
a SVAR model by adding to the set of endogenous variables a proxy for the
global crude oil inventories above the ground. In this way, the speculative
actions of oil players are related to unexpected changes in the demand for
storage. In this analysis there is no evidence in support of the argument that
speculative activities drove up the global price of oil between 2003 and mid
2008. These results are robust to changes in the proxy for global oil invento-
ries, as discussed in Kilian and Lee (2014).
In contrast to this conclusion, Juvenal and Petrella (2015) investigate the
role of speculation on oil prices by adopting a Factor Augmented VAR model
(FAVAR). This analysis finds evidence that financialization of commodity mar-
kets 9 have played an important role in driving the oil price surge between 2004
and 2008. Notwithstanding, the oil consumption demand, driven by economic
activity, remains the main driver to capture the largest fraction of oil price
fluctuations.
A work by Lombardi and Robays (2011) includes data on the oil futures prices
to identify the speculation activities driven by non-fundamental forces. They
use an augmented version of the model proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2014).
The identification structure accounts for the existence of a destabilizing finan-
cial shock, which is defined as a structural shock that raises instantaneously
8As discussed in Kilian and Lee (2014), if the economic agents respond to information
about future state of demand and supply of crude oil, which are not currently included in
the researcher’s information set, the market expectations will differ from those inferred by
researcher and this makes the VAR methodology to disentangle the economic fundamentals
invalid.
9In Fattouh et al. (2013) the authors state that financialization of commodity markets
reflects the increasing acceptance of oil derivatives as a financial asset by a wide range of
market participants including hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and retail
investors.
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the oil futures prices and the oil futures-spot spread.10 The main result by
Lombardi and Robays (2011) suggests that the destabilizing financial shocks
can affect oil prices in the short run with negligible effects on either production
and aggregate demand sides. According to Fattouh et al. (2013), the identifi-
cation scheme leaves unrestricted the sign of the inventories casting doubts on
the validity of all structural shocks.
Finally, a recent study by Baumeister and Hamilton (2017) consists of a
Bayesian SVAR model with inventories and measurement error. This work
sheds light on the importance of the supply shocks to the real price of oil.
Moreover, this analysis provides evidence that structural shocks from supply
and demand sides are equally important to drive much of the fluctuations in
oil prices during the recent period.
10The oil futures-spot spread is defined as the difference between the impulse responses
of the futures and spot prices of crude oil.
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1.3 Data and variables
The following study consists of four monthly aggregate variables based on
time-series data that covers the period 1983:3-2016:7.
The global oil production is measured in thousands of barrels of crude oil and
is expressed in percent changes.
The real price of oil is constructed from the US refiners’ imported acquisition
cost of crude oil (RACi) 11 which is deflated by the US consumer price index.
In this analysis, the choice of RACi as proxy for the global price of crude oil
is motivated by two main reasons. First, according to the extant literature on
modelling the global price of oil, the RACi represents the most relevant mea-
sure for theories interpreting oil price shocks as terms of trade shocks. This
postulates that an unexpected increase in the real cost of imported crude oil
triggered by exogenous events typical of global oil markets causes a decline in
the aggregate domestic income. This is also consistent with the fact that stan-
dard macroeconomic models of the transmission of oil price shocks are specified
in terms of cost of imported crude oil, as discussed in Kilian and Vigfusson
(2011). Second, the existence of alternative oil price measures, such as the
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and the Brent crude oil spot prices are not
representative of the global demand and supply of crude oil. Since, the WTI
spot price has been subject to government regulation it would represent a good
proxy for the U.S. producer price index but it does not provide an accurate
measure for oil price fluctuations in global oil market. The same applies to the
Brent spot price of oil which is the main reference for the Northwest Europe
oil market.
11The refiners’ acquisition cost (RAC) for imported crude oil (RACi) can be defined as the
average price paid by U.S. refiners for imported. It refers to non-U.S. crude oil booked into
the refineries in accordance with accounting procedures generally accepted and consistently
and historically applied by the refiners concerned. The RACi includes transportation and
other fees paid by the refiner.
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For these reasons, the RACi is likely to be a better proxy for the global price
of crude oil. Following Kilian and Murphy (2014) we conduct our analysis by
taking the real price of oil in log deviation from its sample mean.
The macroeconomic indicator we use for this study is the real economic ac-
tivity index (REA) as proposed by Kilian (2009). 12 The following measure
represents a proxy for changes in the volume of shipping of industrial materials
and it is representative for the state of the global economy. According to Kilian
and Zhou (2017) the Kilian’s index provides four important advantages.
First, the coverage of the index is global because it accounts for the emerging
economies like China and India which have played a primary role in determin-
ing the demand of industrial commodities since 2000. Second, it is a direct
measure because it incorporates shifting country weights. Third, the fact that
it is a leading indicator with respect to several real-output measures, such as
global real GDP and world industrial production might facilitate the identi-
fication of the demand of industrial commodities which are treated as inputs
in the production process. Fourth, it is a monthly indicator and its frequency
facilitates the economic interpretation of the identification scheme required by
SVAR models.
Finally, the oil futures-spot spread is defined as the percent deviation of the
12The real economic activity index is available from http://www-personal.umich.edu/
~lkilian/paperlinks.html. This indicator requires raw data for individual dry bulk cargo
freight rates. Following Kilian (2009), the rea index can be derived as follows. First, we
compute the period-to-period growth rates of each available series. Second, we take the
cumulative equal-weighted average of the growth rates, having normalized January of 1968
to unity. Third, the index has to be deflated by the US CPI index. Despite, our analysis
starts in 1983 (because WTI oil spot prices are available from that period) we use the original
version of the rea index. This approach does not undermine the accuracy of our empirical
results. We point out that, in 1980, four series are involved for the construction of the index
and they remain the same until 1983, the period in which we start our analysis. Therefore,
there is not much difference from the cross average of the raw data for individual freight
rates and their cumulative average growth rate if the index is constructed starting in 1960
or in 1983. The only difference is the change in the normalization applied to the starting
value of the index but this does not compromise the economic meaning of the indicator for
the future periods.
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futures price 13 from the spot price of oil. To derive the oil futures-spot spread
we also include prices from WTI futures market, although the Brent futures
contracts are known as the world’s crude oil benchmark. The main reason is
that, WTI prices allow us to extend the dataset from 1983, since the Brent
spot prices became available only in 1986. Therefore for the first period (April
1983 - January 2002) we use futures and spot prices from WTI market with
delivery at Cushing, Oklahoma. As regards the second period (February 2002
- July 2016) we use prices from Brent futures and spot markets.
One might be skeptical of the oil futures-spot spread as a reliable proxy for
Figure 1.1: Crude oil spot prices and oil futures-spot spread
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Note: Blue and red lines denote 6-months moving average of Brent and WTI oil spot
prices, respectively. Green line refers to 6-months moving average of US refiners’
acquisition cost imported (RACi). Black line indicates the 6-months moving average
of oil futures-spot spread.
international crude oil inventories market value. The main reason is that the
futures-spot spread is derived from prices referred to some specific locations
around the world. With respect to this, we highlight that both WTI and Brent
13A monthly measure of oil futures price is the end-of-month value of the last trading day
of the futures contract with maturity 3 months. The monthly spot price of oil is derived by
taking the end-of-month value of the daily oil spot prices. Both prices are available from
Datastream provider.
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futures prices represent financial instruments for hedging or speculative actions
and they are usually closed out (or rolled over) before their expires date. For
this reason the futures contracts are globally traded and their prices are mainly
driven by expectations on worldwide oil economic fundamentals. Further, one
might argue that the validity of global coverage related to the oil-futures spot
spread could be undermine by the presence of different types of oil spot prices.
This is not the case because there exist a strong pairwise correlation between
the spot prices used to construct the spread and the RACi.
In a storable commodity market, like crude oil, the theory of storage helps to
explain the price-setting of some commodities, focusing on the role of stocks,
under arbitrage conditions. Basically, the management of oil inventories re-
quires an intertemporal balance between demand and supply of oil. This im-
plies that the value of the inventory changes will depend on the relationship
between the current and the expected future spot price.
Figure 1.1 plots the six months moving average of four series: the nominal
monthly spot log-prices 14 of WTI, Brent blends, RACi and the oil futures-
spot spread. It shows that, if the physical market is subject to an unexpected
increase in demand for crude oil, the rise in global spot prices might be likely
followed by a reduction in the level of inventories in order to meet the cur-
rent demand. This causes an increase in the global value of storage which is
reflected by the negative of the oil futures spot spread. Thus, oil companies
have strong incentives to carry on the optimal management of oil stocks in or-
der to reduce adjustment costs of production and facilitate the delivery of the
commodity. As discussed in Pindyck (1994), if a refiner had a small amount
of crude oil in its storage it would face with an higher risk of stocks-out and
14Time series are available from the web site of the EIA: nominal brent and wti oil spot
prices can be downloaded from https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_SPT_S1_M.htm
while for the imported RAC series the link is https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_
rac2_dcu_nus_m.htm
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the benefit of holding an extra barrel of oil would be very high. Conversely if
the refiner had a large and full storage of crude oil the benefit accruing from
the marginal unit of inventory would decline and the marginal storage cost
would increase. This last case would be reflected by a positive value of the oil
futures-spot spread. Therefore, it is not surprising to note that increases in
the real price of oil are often followed by declines in the oil futures-spot spread,
as shown in figure 1.1.
A study of Alquist and Kilian (2010) provides empirical evidence that oil
futures-spot spread was highly correlated with cumulative effect of precau-
tionary demand shocks on the real price of oil. The authors show that the
pairwise correlation became weaker between 2004 and 2006, raising concerns
about the relationship between the financial forward-looking variable and the
real price of oil mainly triggered by precautionary demand shocks. The VAR
model discussed in the next section offers an economic explanation to changes
in the oil futures-spot spread. This is based on the idea that understanding the
co-movements between the financial forward-looking variable and the global
price of oil requires a structural model that takes into account the endogenous
relationship among variables.
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1.4 Econometric method
In this paper we conduct an empirical analysis of the global real price of
crude oil based on the following SVAR model:
B0yt = α +
24∑
j=1
Bjyt−j + vt (1.1)
where α is vector of constant terms 15 and B0 is a matrix capturing the simul-
taneous relations among the endogenous variables 16 which are collected in the
vector yt = (qt, reat, pt, st)
′. The set of aggregate variables includes: the per-
cent change in the crude oil production (qt), a measure of cyclical fluctuations
in the real economic activity (reat) as proposed by Kilian (2009), the real price
of crude oil (pt) and the oil futures-spot spread (st). The model reported in
this work sets two years’ lags 17 and includes dummies variables to remove any
seasonality effect. The vector vt collects the orthogonal structural innovations
of the model.
An “oil supply shock (S)” is related to unexpected changes in the world oil
production. For example, an oil supply disruption is associated with wars and
concerns about stability of oil supplies from the Middle East, strategic deci-
sions from OPEC members and other exogenous events in the oil-producing
15The seasonal dummies have been suppressed for notional convenience.
16This analysis does not include the global proxy for crude oil inventories above the ground
for three main reasons. First, we emphasize the original idea of this work where the for-
ward looking expectations of oil traders are inferred from financial side by exploiting the
information embodied in the oil futures-spot spread. Therefore the inclusion of the physical
forward-looking variable would lead to a redundancy of information. Second, the inclusion
of crude oil inventory proxy complicates the identification strategy and the interpretation of
the structural shocks. Third, the economic theory suggests that the oil futures-spot spread
is not a linear and convex function of the level of inventories, see Fama and French (1987);
Pindyck (1994) and Gorton et al. (2013). Therefore, we do not specify a model with both
variables (oil futures-spot spread and a proxy for crude oil inventories) because their linear
relationship implied by model 1.1 may be a poor approximation.
17Applying high lag order (24 months of lags) is relevant to capture the dynamic of the
economic business cycle and to allow the model for proper transmission of the structural
shocks, in accordance with Kilian (2009); Kilian and Lutkepohl (2016).
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countries.
An “aggregate demand shock (AD)” is associated with changes in the global
demand for crude oil and other industrial commodities mainly driven by fluctu-
ations in the real economic activity. For example, a positive AD shock reflects
an unexpected increase in the current demand for crude oil driven by emerging
oil-consuming countries.
A “precautionary demand shock (PD)” is related to scheduled changes in the
convenience yield triggered by uncertainty about shortfalls of expected supply
relative to future demand. For example, a positive PD shock reflects an unex-
pected increase in the demand for storage due to wars, political tensions in the
Middle East or other economic factors related to the physical oil markets, as
discussed in Kilian (2009); Alquist and Kilian (2010) and Kilian and Murphy
(2014).
A “financial market shock (FM)”is designed to capture a change in the benefit
of holding crude oil inventories for reasons not already indicated by the previ-
ous three structural shocks of the model.
For example, an unexpected positive FM shock might be driven by a specula-
tive purchase of oil futures contracts, arbitrage mechanisms used to restore the
equilibrium between financial and physical markets, an increase in the global
strategic petroleum reserves and other forms of financial incentives that are
implemented to keep crude oil off the spot markets.
1.4.1 The identification
The estimation of the structural model reported in equation 1.1 follows the
algorithm as is typical of the SVAR model identified based on sign restriction
discussed in Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010). Appendix 1.9 provides a description
of the estimation and the implementation of the identification strategy. The
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latter is based on a combination of sign restrictions and bounds on the ratio
of the elements of the impact multiplier matrix. Boundary restrictions are
often interpreted in terms of contemporaneous price elasticity of oil demand
and supply. This procedure allows the identification of a single model among
a set-identified structural global oil market VAR models.
The economic interpretation of sign restrictions
Table 1.1 reports the sign restrictions on the impact responses of crude
oil production, economic activity, real price of oil and oil futures-spot spread
to each structural shock identified by the SVAR model. The compounded
expression of the oil futures-spot spread can be defined as follow:
st =
Ft,T − Pt
Pt
= rt,T + kt,T − ψt,T (1.2)
where Ft,T is the oil futures price observed at time t for delivery at a specified
future date T , Pt is the spot price of crude oil at time t and rt,T is risk-
free interest rate for the period from time t to T . Moreover, the marginal
cost of storage per unit of inventory is kt,T and ψt,T represents the marginal
convenience yield per unit of storage. 18
In the theory of storage the notion of marginal convenience yield reflects the
flow of benefits accruing from one extra barrel of crude oil and is thought of as
a decreasing and convex function of the amount of inventories. It is important
to point out that the existence of the marginal convenience yield raises the
possibility of the oil futures-spot spread to be negative. This implies that the
spot price of oil will exceed the current futures price. A stylised theoretical
model in the spirit of Eastham (1939) is discussed in appendix 1.10. This helps
18The algebraic sum of ψt,T and kt,T is known as the convenience yield at net of the cost
of storage namely the net-marginal convenience yield.
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to motivate the sign restrictions on impact responses reported in table 1.1 and
the empirical results presented in section 1.5.
Table 1.1: Sign restrictions on impact responses in the SVAR model
Variables Negative Positive Positive Positive
& supply aggregate precautionary financial
Shocks shock demand shock demand shock market shock
Oil production - + + ()
Real economic activity - + - ()
Real price of oil + + + +
Oil futures-spot spread - - - +
Note: All shocks are normalized to obtain an increase in the price of oil. Missing
entries mean that no sign restriction on the elements of the impact multiplier matrix
is imposed.
An unanticipated oil supply disruption represents a shift to the left of the
contemporaneous oil supply curve along the oil demand curve mainly triggered
by exogenous events in oil-producing countries.
This shock causes an instantaneous reduction in the global oil production and
in the real economic activity followed by an increase in the real price of oil.
In the financial market the futures price will likely rise but by less than the
spot price and the effect of the shock on the oil futures-spot spread will be
negative, on impact.
An unanticipated positive aggregate demand shock represents a shift to the
right of the contemporaneous oil demand curve along the oil supply curve
mainly driven by fluctuations in the global business cycle.
This shock causes an instantaneous increase in the real economic activity.
Moreover, the unexpected increase in the demand for crude oil will cause the
spot price of oil to rise and the oil futures-spot spread to drop. The latter
reflects an increase in the marginal convenience yield motivated by the reduc-
tion in the level of the inventories in order to mitigate the adverse effects of
the shock on the global market for crude oil.
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A unanticipated positive precautionary demand shock represents a shift to the
right of the oil demand curve along the oil supply curve, mainly driven by an
increase in the demand for storage.
The structural shock is designed to capture the benefit of having an extra
barrel of oil as insurance against uncertainty about future supply shortfalls
relative to expected demand. As pointed out by Kilian (2009), the interrup-
tion of the global production of crude oil might happen because of concerns
over unexpected growth of demand, over unexpected declines of supply, or over
both. In other words this shock coincides with precautionary changes in the
level of inventories driven by a scheduled increase in the convenience yield of
any given amount of stock.
As a consequence positive precautionary demand shocks cause the oil futures-
spot spread to decline and real price of oil to increase, on impact. The following
result is consistent with the general equilibrium model discussed in Alquist and
Kilian (2010). 19
An unanticipated positive financial market shock represents an accumulation
of crude oil inventories triggered by a rise in the crude oil futures price, for rea-
sons not already embodied by the previous three structural shocks. A positive
FM shock causes oil-futures spot spread and real price of oil to rise instanta-
neously.
As reported in the last column of table 1.1, the impact responses of production
and real economic activity to a positive financial market shock is ambiguous.
On the one hand, oil producers might increase their level of production if they
19Alquist and Kilian (2010) develop a two-country general equilibrium model of the oil
futures and oil spot markets in which an oil-producing country exports oil to an oil-consuming
country. The authors show that the oil futures-spot spread can be interpreted as an index of
shift in expectations about future oil-supply shortfalls. Moreover Alquist and Kilian (2010)
prove formally that a sufficient increase in uncertainty about a future oil supply disruption
causes a drop of the oil-futures spot spread and an increase in the current real spot price of
crude oil, as precautionary demand for crude oil inventories increases.
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are interested in earning current profits. On the other hand, they might reduce
global oil production, store it and wait to sell crude oil at the highest expected
price. Therefore, the accumulation of crude oil inventories might cause an in-
crease in the real price of crude oil followed by a reduction in the real economic
activity. Alternatively, the increase in the price of oil triggered by a positive
FM shock might also anticipate a global economic expansion, as discussed in
Sockin and Xiong (2015).
The financial market shock
This new shock is designed to capture an instantaneous reduction of the
convenience yield (as opposed to a positive precautionary demand shock)
and/or a sharp increase in the cost of storage during the inventories’ build-
up.
Therefore a positive financial market shock represents an instantaneous in-
crease in the oil futures-spot spread followed by a rise in the real price of oil.
As a result, this new shock explicitly links the financial and physical markets
for crude oil.
For example, let us suppose that some traders bet on the rising price of crude
oil. They start buying futures contracts in order to sell them in the future at
a higher price, leaving the storage of the commodity to someone else.
By arbitrage mechanisms and ignoring the negligible effects of the interest
rate 20 the speculative purchase of futures contracts drives their prices up and
causes an accumulation of oil stocks.
The inventory build-up is followed by an increase in the oil futures-spot spread
because of a reduction in the marginal net-convenience yield. As a result, the
futures prices are greater than current spot prices in order to compensate the
20Frankel and Rose (2010) do not provide evidence of a relevant role played by the real
interest rate in influencing the price of the commodities.
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inventory holders for the high cost associated with storage. Therefore, the
financial incentives that are implemented to keep crude oil off the physical
market cause an increase in the real price of oil.
The other channel through which a speculative purchase of futures contracts
might rise the real price of oil in the spot markets is represented by opposite
and simultaneous shifts of both contemporaneous supply and demand curves,
as presented in the theoretical model discussed in appendix 1.10 and in Juve-
nal and Petrella (2015). This case requires a shift to the left of the production
curve greater enough to prevail over a shift to the right of the demand curve
causing the real price of oil to rise, the global production to decline and the
oil-inventories to build-up. The latter is reflected by an increase in the oil
futures-spot spread.
Boundary restrictions
Following Kilian and Murphy (2014), we start to generate a set of 5 mil-
lion structural models and retain only those that satisfy all sign restrictions
reported in table 1.1.
At this stage we end up with a subset of identified-models. Then we impose
on the elements of the instantaneous multiplier matrix boundaries restrictions
that are interpreted in terms of impact price elasticity of oil demand and sup-
ply.
The impact price elasticity of oil demand 21 must be greater than 0 but lower
than -0.8. This last value represents a possible benchmark of the long-run
price elasticity as reported by Hausman and Newey (1995). In this work we
21The impact price elasticity of oil demand is computed as the ratio between the impact
response of global oil production and the impact response of the real price of crude oil to an
oil supply shock.
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set three times the upper bound 22 of the impact price elasticity of oil supply,
originally imposed by Kilian and Murphy (2014). Therefore the new value of
short-run price elasticity of oil supply is 0.0774 and is motivated by the fol-
lowing reasons.
First, the authors propose a suggestive value of the supply elasticity which
refers to a specific event occurred in August 1990, during the Persian Gulf
war. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the same value could necessarily hold
after twenty years. Moreover, studies by Baumeister and Hamilton (2017),
Knittel and Pindyck (2016) and Caldara et al. (2017) discuss episodes where
some oil producer countries, like Saudi Arabia, could react rapidly to oil ex-
ogenous events. All these cases imply a short run supply elasticity even three
times grater than the upper bound suggested by Kilian and Murphy (2014).
Second, the short-run oil supply curve should be coherent with all structural
shocks. Kilian and Murphy (2014) impose an upper bound for the supply elas-
ticity ignoring the existence of the residual structural shock. It can be shown
that such approach yields a set of models where the supply curve is much
more elastic in response to residual shock than what implied by the first-three
structural shocks.
In our analysis we ensure that the elasticity of oil supply cannot significantly
vary across different changes in the global demand for crude oil.
At this step, we end up with a set of models satisfying the sign restrictions
on the impact multiplier matrix and the elasticity of oil demand and supply.
Moreover, we impose a boundary restriction on the elements of the impact
multiplier matrix that is related to the real economic activity. In particular
22The identification of the supply elasticity requires an exogenous shift of the demand
curve along the supply curve. In order to compute the upper bound of the impact price
elasticity of oil supply Kilian and Murphy (2012) compute a ratio between the percentage
changes of the global oil production (excluding Iraq and Kuwait) and the percentage change
of the oil price increase. The outcome of this ratio is 0.0258 for the period between July and
August 1990. All details can be found in the on-line appendix of Kilian and Murphy (2012).
32
1.4. Econometric method
we rule out all cases where the response of real economic activity to financial
market shocks are larger than aggregate demand shocks.
The short run price supply elasticity is defined as the ratio between the impact
response of the global oil production and the impact response of the real price
of oil to each structural demand shock. Therefore, we have three different val-
ues of price supply elasticities 0.0774. For the sake of consistency, we focus on
that specification that yields the lowest coefficient of variation for the impact
price elasticity of oil supply and we select the model satisfying the short-run
price demand elasticity closest to the posterior median demand elasticity of the
set-identified models. This allows to pin-down a value for the price elasticity
of oil demand coherent with the choice of admissible models.
33
1. Modelling the global price of oil: is there any role for the oil futures-spot spread?
1.5 Empirical results
Impulse response analysis. In this section we proceed to the analysis of
the dynamic responses of the endogenous variables to each structural shock.
Figure 1.2 plots the results obtained from the orthogonalized impulse response
functions of the SVAR model reported in equation 1.1.
An unexpected oil supply disruption reflects an instantaneous reduction in
the global oil production associated with a persistent increase in the real price
of oil within the first year. The impact responses of the real economic activity
and the oil futures-spot spread to an oil supply disruption is negative. The
drop of the financial forward-looking variable reflects an increase in the conve-
nience yield driven by a decline of the crude oil inventories.
An unexpected positive aggregate demand shock causes permanent rises in the
real economic activity and in the real price of oil which are followed by a slight
increase in the global oil production. The impact response of the oil futures-
spot spread is negative as suggested by the economic theory.
An unexpected positive precautionary demand shock causes a sharp increase
in the real price of oil. This shock is also associated with a drop in the real
economic activity combined with a slight increase in the global oil production.
The negative and large response of the oil futures-spot spread to a positive
precautionary demand shock is consistent with an upward shift of the conve-
nience yield. Since the benefit of having an extra barrel of crude oil is very
high, futures price must be lower than current spot price of crude oil in order
to maintain the equilibrium between spot and futures markets.
An unexpected positive financial market shock causes an increase in the oil
futures-spot spread and in the real price of oil, on impact. A positive value
of the spread reflects a situation where the futures price is greater than corre-
sponding current spot price of oil.
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For example, oil speculators bet on rising prices and they start buying futures
contracts. The speculative purchase provides financial incentive for oil compa-
nies to buy even more oil and place it in storage causing the real price of oil
to rise.
The accumulation of oil stocks might be reinforced by the negative response
of the global oil production to a positive financial market shock. This result
suggests that oil producers are induced to accumulate inventories in order to
sell them at the highest price. Beyond the impact period, the oil futures-spot
spread exhibits a sharp reduction followed by a persistent increase in the real
price of crude oil. 23
Forecast error variance decomposition. We provide some empirical re-
sults of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) 24 of the endogenous
variables implied by model 1.1.
In the short run the real price of oil is mainly driven by financial market shocks,
accounting for up to 44% of oil price variability. Shocks to precautionary and
aggregate demand represent the second and third drivers of oil price fluctua-
tions, with 34% and 17% respectively. Supply shocks have negligible impact
on oil price fluctuations, explaining for up to 5%. Interestingly, shocks to the
aggregate demand explain up to 39% of oil futures-spot spread fluctuations
while precautionary demand shocks contribute up to 15%.
In turn, the explanatory power of shocks to oil supply and financial market
represent 15% and 16% of the fluctuations in oil futures-spot spread, respec-
23It is important to note that whenever the increases in the oil futures prices are driven
by reasons not strictly related to economic fundamentals the arbitrage mechanism can be
exploited. The optimal response of the arbitragers is to buy crude oil in the physical market
and to sell simultaneously the corresponds amount of futures contracts in the financial
market. This strategy is reflected by a contemporaneous increase in the real price of oil and
a reduction in the futures prices causing the oil futures-spot spread to decline.
24The FEVD allows to quantify the average contribution of a given structural shock to
the variability of the data.
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tively. These results imply that, on average, shocks to aggregate demand play
an important role in explaining the variability of the oil futures spot spread.
Historical decomposition. Traditional oil market VAR models include a
global proxy for crude oil inventories to capture forward-looking expectations
(hence, speculative actions) of oil traders; see among the others Kilian and
Murphy (2014); Kilian and Lee (2014); Lombardi and Robays (2011) and
Baumeister and Hamilton (2017). Therefore the speculative demand for crude
oil reflects a rise in the demand for storage for precautionary purposes or more
in general for future consumption. For this investigation we use the definition
of oil price speculation as discussed in Fattouh et al. (2013) because in prin-
ciple both Commercial and Non-Commercial firms 25 could influence the path
of the convenience yield.
The authors state that “anyone buying crude oil not for current consumption
but for future use” can be considered as a speculator from the economic point
of view. The case discussed in Kilian and Murphy (2014) refers to a situation
where the inventories’ build-up is explained by an increase in the demand for
storage. This causes an instantaneous reduction in the oil futures-spot spread
which is mainly driven by a rise in the convenience yield. Another possibility
is that the accumulation of crude oil inventories causes a contemporaneous
increase in the oil futures-spot spread which is mainly explained by a decline
in the convenience yield. Therefore the existence of speculative pressure can
be identified from changes in the oil futures-spot spread in response to unan-
ticipated financial market shocks. In the last part of this subsection we discuss
25The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) provides two macro categories
for the oil market players: commercial and non-commercial firms. The former include phys-
ical participants such as producers, merchants, processors and end-users that have a direct
interest in physical oil production, consumption and trade. The latter are mainly made by
financial participants like money managers and hedge funds that are interested in trading
futures contracts for investment purposes.
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the cumulative effect of each shock on the real price of oil, oil futures-spot
spread and the global oil production.
Figure 1.3 plots the historical decomposition of the above mentioned three en-
dogenous variables.
During the period 2002-2008, panel (2,1) of figure 1.3 shows that the in-
crease in the real price of oil was mainly triggered by shocks to aggregate
demand, most likely driven by global economic growth from OECD countries
and emerging Asia. However, the cumulative effect of the aggregate demand
shocks decreased between the beginning of 2005 and mid 2006 and rose again
until mid-2008. Since 2003 the financial market shocks have contributed sig-
nificantly to the oil price increase as shown in panel (4,1).
Interestingly, panel (4,2) shows that both rises in the real price of oil and in
the oil futures-spot spread were attributed to positive financial market shocks.
The latter are likely to reflect a reduction in the convenience yield driven by
speculative purchases of futures contracts. Panel (4,3) shows that post-2006,
high levels of oil futures-spot spread were associated with a reduction in the
global crude oil production, mainly driven by positive financial market shocks.
These results might be representative of economic incentives to take oil off the
physical market and increase the worldwide oil stocks. 26
It is important to highlight that panel (3,1) does not provide empirical evi-
dence that the demand for precautionary inventories drove up the real price
of oil during the financialization of commodity markets, consistent with the
studies of Kilian and Murphy (2014) and Kilian and Lee (2014).
Moreover the surge of the real price of oil during the first six months of 2008
26A large fraction of the increase in the global crude oil inventories might be explained by
an accumulation of crude oil strategic reserves to protect the economy of emerging countries
like China and India against short-term energy crisis.
In the recent period, India continues developing its strategic petroleum reserve, as pointed
out by the EIA: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27132.
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was primary driven by oil demand shocks. In June 2008 the real price of crude
oil fell due to the world financial crisis. The main economic reasons behind
this drop were explained by negative shocks to precautionary demand for oil in
anticipation of the world recession and negative shocks to aggregate demand.
By contrast, since August 2008 both the precautionary and the aggregate de-
mand shocks stimulated the recover of the oil prices.
Panel (1,1) shows that in February 2011 there was a small evidence of an
increase in the real price of oil associated with the revolution wave in Arab
countries.
Finally, the decline in the global price of oil started in November 2014 was
mainly driven by a simultaneous combination of the first-three structural shocks.
On the supply side, the decline in the price of crude oil might be reflected by
the large recovery of oil production from Libya, Syria and Iraq combined with
the OPEC’s announcement on November 2014 to not reduce the level of crude
oil production. Moreover, the OPEC’s announcement should also explain a
large reduction in the precautionary demand for storage causing the real price
of oil to decline and the oil futures-spot spread to increase, as shown in panels
(3,1) and (3,2), respectively. Overall, positive supply shocks and a weak de-
mand for crude oil from OECD and emerging countries caused a reduction in
the real price of oil during the recent period.
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1.6 A comparison between SVAR models of
the global market for crude oil
This section investigates the main features of SVAR models of the global
market for crude oil, reported in table 1.2.
These models are classified according to the types of forward-looking variable
(crude oil inventories vs oil futures-spot spread) and the methodology applied
to recover the structural shocks. Further details of the identification strategy
are reported in appendix 1.9. For each model we provide the economic inter-
Table 1.2: Alternative SVAR models for global crude oil markets
Identification structure Oil futures-spot spread Oil inventories
Sign restrictions M0 M1
Recursive model M2 M3
Non Recursive model M4 M5
Note: M0 refers to the benchmark SVAR model introduced in this analysis. M1 is
the model proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2014). M2, M3, M4 and M5 are SVAR
models whose structural response estimates are obtained following the Bayesian
algorithm proposed by Baumeister and Hamilton (2015). M2 and M3 are recursive
models including oil futures-spot spread and crude oil inventories, respectively. M4
is a non-recursive model with oil futures-spot spread. M5 is a 4-variable model with
inventories and measurement error discussed in Baumeister and Hamilton (2017)
pretation of the related identification structure with reference to the implied
elasticity of oil demand and oil supply. Moreover, we propose a pairwise com-
parison of benchmark model (M0) and other specifications that are reported
in table 1.2. The comparison is made on the responses of real price of oil
and forward-looking variables to each structural shock. Finally we provide a
qualitative ranking for the models of interest.
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1.6.1 The identification of the structural shocks: an
evaluation of different approaches
The first candidate is the model of the global market for crude oil proposed
by Kilian and Murphy (2014).
The dataset we use in our empirical work 27 is based on monthly observations
which cover the period 1973:2-2009:9. The endogenous variables are (1) the
growth rate of monthly crude oil production (qt), the real economic activity
index (reat), the real price of crude oil (pt) and a proxy for global crude oil
inventories above the ground (invt).
The authors recover the structural shocks starting from consistent estimates of
the reduced-form VAR model with 24 lags. Then, they impose a specific set of
sign and dynamic restrictions on the impulse response functions combined with
economic bounds on the impact price elasticity of oil supply and demand.28
The relationship between the VAR reduced-form errors (ut) and the structural
shocks (vt) is defined as follow:

uqt
ureat
upt
uinvt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
=

− + + ()
− + − ()
+ + + ()
() () + ()

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B−10

vflow supply shockt
vaggregate demand shockt
vspeculative demand shockt
vresidual structural shockt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
vt
(1.3)
All structural shocks are normalized to obtain an increase in the price of oil
on impact. Missing entries mean that no sign restrictions are imposed. For
example, an unexpected oil supply disruption causes a drop in the global oil
production followed by an instantaneous increase in the real price of oil and a
27For this section we use the dataset from Kilian and Murphy (2014), available from the
following web-site http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/jae/2014-v29.3/kilian-murphy/.
28Dynamic restrictions are imposed on the response of global oil production, real economic
activity and real price of crude oil to a supply shock.
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reduction in the real economic activity. The effect of the shock on the sign of
crude oil inventories is ambiguous. This depends on whether crude oil stocks
are used for consumption smoothing or precautionary purposes.
An unanticipated positive flow demand shock rises the real economic activity
causing the price of oil and the global oil production to increase, on impact.
So, even in this case, the effect of the shock on the oil inventories remains
ambiguous.
A positive speculative demand shock 29 coincides with an increase in the de-
mand for storage reflected by revision in the forward-looking expectations. The
accumulation of crude oil inventories causes global oil production and oil prices
to increase whereas the real economic activity to fall, on impact.
Finally, a positive residual shock represents an idiosyncratic innovation which
is orthogonal to the previous structural shocks.
It is important to point out that, the baseline specification of our empirical
work and the model proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2014) adopt the same
methodology to recover the structural shocks.
In particular, the procedure is based on the numerical algorithm discussed in
Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010). This context is suitable for a comparative anal-
ysis of the transmission mechanism of oil price shocks. In this respect, several
comments can be summarised as follows.
First of all, in M1 an oil supply disruption and a positive speculative supply
shock are observationally equivalent. In this case both structural shocks reflect
a reduction in the global oil production in anticipation of rising prices.
In general the economic factors behind a flow supply disruption are not related
29The speculative demand a’ la Kilian and Murphy might reflect different situations such
as (1) an expected shortfall of future oil supply relative to future oil demand, (2) an unantic-
ipated shift in uncertainty about future oil disruption and (3) changes in beliefs not strictly
related to expected fundamentals. The authors do not consider oil futures prices in their
analysis but they exploit the existence of an arbitrage free condition between financial and
physical markets.
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to speculative reasons. This would imply that a separate transmission channel
should be adopted to explain properly oil price speculation, as considered in
the identification structure of M0.
Moreover the response of the real economic activity to an oil supply disruption
and a positive speculative shock could be different in sign. In other words, neg-
ative supply shocks are likely to cause a rise in the price of oil associated with
a decline in the economic activity. On the other hand, oil price increases due
to speculation activities could not necessary imply a slowdown of the global
business cycle. 30
Another comment that we would like to make concerns the identification in
term of sign restrictions. Specifically, the benchmark model proposed in this
analysis is fully identified. In contrast, the non-recursive model discussed by
Kilian and Murphy (2014) is partially identified. This last issue might compli-
cate the economic interpretation of the residual structural shock.
Finally, another marked difference stems from the boundary restrictions im-
posed on elements of the impact multiplier matrix in order to generate realistic
short-run price elasticity of oil supply.
For consistency, we relax the upper bound restriction on the impact price elas-
ticity of oil supply implied by M1. Thus, we set three times grater the original
bound proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2012).
In this study, we show results for M1 with the lowest coefficient of variation
for the impact price elasticity of oil supply and with the impact price elastic-
ity of oil demand closest to that reported by M0. Impulse response analysis
discussed in section 1.6.3 provides evidence that the following changes do not
affect the main results of the original model proposed by Kilian and Murphy
30As shown in appendix 1.10, the effect of speculation on oil prices might be described by
a simultaneous shifts of oil demand and oil supply curves in the opposite directions rather
than a shift to the left of the contemporaneous oil supply curve along the oil demand curve.
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(2014).
The second candidate is the recursive model with oil futures-spot spread.
We employ monthly data from 1983:3 to 2016:7. The set of observables includes
the growth rate of monthly crude oil production (qt), the real economic activity
index (reat), the oil futures-spot spread (st) and the real price of crude oil (pt).
In general, the main feature of the recursive models is that they are exactly
identified. This means that there exist a unique impact multiplier matrix (B−10 )
capturing the instantaneous relations among the structural parameters given
a specific ordering variables of the reduced-form VAR model with 12 lags.
The recursive SVAR model with oil futures-spot spread implies the following
relationship between the structural shocks (vt) and the VAR reduced-form
errors (ut):

voil supply shockt
vaggregate demand shockt
vprecautionary demand shockt
vresidual structural shockt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
vt
=

1 0 0 0
−brea,q 1 0 0
−bs,q −bs,rea 1 0
−bp,q −bp,rea −bp,s 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B0

uqt
ureat
ust
upt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
(1.4)
This analysis consists of the specification of informative prior beliefs repre-
sented in form of density functions about B0, the lagged structural matrix and
the vector collecting the structural disturbances. At this stage we focus only
on the elements of the contemporaneous structural matrix B0.
The Bayesian analysis of a recursive model is equivalent to impose a set of zero
(or exclusion) restrictions on the elements above the main diagonal of B0 and
to put flat (or uninformative) prior distribution for the other parameters.
Thus, for all elements that are not restricted to zero we assign independent
Student t distribution with location parameter ci = 0, scale σi = 100 and
degree of freedom ν = 3, as suggested by Baumeister and Hamilton (2017).
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What really matters, is to impose exclusion restrictions economic plausible.
For example, the first row of B0 contains the instantaneous parameters of the
oil supply curve. Given the existence of large costs of production typical of
the oil industry we postulate that the crude oil supply curve is completely
inelastic. As a consequence, the global oil production does not respond to any
demand shocks within the same month. This is consistent with the following
set of economic restrictions: bq,rea = bq,s = bq,p = 0.
The second row of B0 governs the economic activity equation and identifies the
aggregate demand shock. This is related to unexpected change in the demand
for oil and other industrial commodities mainly driven by the global business
cycle.
The recursive structure of matrix B0 implies that global oil production might
affect instantaneously the economic activity. On the other hand, the remaining
parameters involved in the second equation are set to zero.
The exclusion restriction on brea,p is consistent with the absence of contem-
poraneous feedback between the real economic activity index and the price of
oil. This is motivated by the fact that ocean carries set fuel charges for single-
voyage rates on the basis of the weekly average of each route over the preceding
three months, as discussed by Kilian and Zhou (2017). For the same reason
we impose the exclusion restriction on the parameter brea,s of the economic
activity equation.
The third row of B0 includes the structural parameters of the oil futures spot
spread that are used to identify the precautionary demand shock. A positive
shock triggered by precautionary purposes implies an increase in the demand
for the above-ground crude oil inventories associated with a rise in the global
market value of storage. 31 By construction, there can be no instantaneous
31Since the oil futures-spot spread represents a proxy for the market value of storage but
expressed with an opposite sign, we expect that a positive precautionary demand shock is
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feedback from the price of oil to oil futures-spot spread, implying an exclusion
restriction on the coefficient bsp. This means that the financial forward looking
variable is more related to expectations on future oil market conditions rather
than changes in the current spot prices.
It is important to note that, by setting bsp = 0, we rule out the role of con-
sumption smoothing for storage and futures markets during high level of oil
prices driven by positive residual structural shocks. The latter represent unan-
ticipated changes in the price of oil that cannot be explained by the first three
shocks and it is identified by all parameters of the inverse oil demand function,
reported in equation 1.4.
Of particular importance for our purposes is the parameter bp,q. This repre-
sents the reciprocal of the short-run price elasticity of oil demand which is
directly inferred from B0.
The third candidate is the recursive model with a proxy for global crude
oil inventories above the ground. As described previously, for this analysis
we use monthly data from 1983:3 to 2016:7. This model allows for one year’
worth of lags and includes a set of endogenous variables ordered as follow:
(qt,reat,invt,pt). This implies the following relationship between vt and ut:

voil supply shockt
vaggregate demand shockt
vprecautionary demand shockt
vresidual structural shockt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Vt
=

1 0 0 0
−brea,q 1 0 0
−binv,q −binv,rea 1 0
−bp,q −bp,rea −bp,inv 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B0

uqt
ureat
uinvt
upt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
(1.5)
We impose a set of six exclusion restrictions on the elements of B0 forming
a lower triangular matrix and we assign uninformative prior Student t distri-
bution with location parameter ci = 0, scale parameter σ = 100 and ν = 3
reflected by a decline in the oil futures-spot spread.
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degrees of freedom for the remaining structural coefficients.
The main difference from M2 stemming from the type of proxy for the forward-
looking expectations of oil traders. In the previous specification, the future
crude oil market conditions are inferred from a financial measure (as a proxy
for the market price of crude oil-stocks) derived by crude oil futures contracts.
In contrast, this model includes a proxy for the above-ground crude oil inven-
tories as widely accepted in the empirical literature on modelling the price of
oil. Notwithstanding, the transmission mechanism of the structural shocks are
identical in both SVAR models since they are examples of recursive specifica-
tions.
Under frequentist inference, in order to retrieve the elements of the impact
multiplier matrix, that is B−10 , it is sufficient to apply a Cholesky factorization
of the variance covariance matrix of reduced-form errors term. This approach
involves a simple identification strategy which is motivated by the economic
theory. Therefore, recursive SVAR models are definitely easy to be employed
and they provide answers to some interesting questions.
The fourth candidate is the non-recursive model with oil futures-spot spread.
For this investigation we use monthly data from 1983:3 to 2016:7. The identifi-
cation of this model exploits some prior beliefs on the elements of the structural
matrix B0. This model allows for one year’ worth of lags and includes a set of
four endogenous variables, that is: (qt,reat,st,pt).
The relationship between the vt and ut has the following representation:

uqt
ureat
ust
upt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
ut
=

1 0 −bq,p 0
−brea,q 1 −brea,p 0
−bp,q −bp,rea 1 −bp,s
−bp,q −bp,rea −bp,p 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B0

voil supply shockt
vaggregate demand shockt
vprecautionary demand shockt
vresidual structural shockt

︸ ︷︷ ︸
vt
(1.6)
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The parameter, bqp denotes the short-run price elasticity of oil supply. For
our prior for bqp we assign a student t (cqp, σqp, νqp) distribution, with mode at
cqp = 0.1, scale parameter σqp = 0.2 and degrees of freedom νqp = 3, truncated
to be positive.
Because the Kilian (2009) index of global real economic activity (rea) is derived
from bulk dry cargo ocean shipping fright rates we are confident to put a prior
distribution for brea,q with mode at crea,q = 0, scale parameter σrea,q = 0.1 and
degrees of freedom νrea,q = 3. This implies the absence of feedback between
changes in the amount of crude oil and the real economic activity index.
Recently, the Kilian’s index exhibited some erratic behaviour that is hard to
square with smooth fluctuations in the global business cycle.
A potential bias might arise because of the dependence between the bulk dry
cargo rates and the price of crude oil. The validity of this economic conjecture
can be easily tested under Bayesian framework.
For this reason, we represent the effect of oil prices on the real economic activity
index with a very uninformative student t (crea,p, σrea,p, νrea,p) prior distribu-
tion for brea,p with mode at crea,p = 0, scale parameter σrea,p = 100, degrees
of freedom νrea,p = 3 and truncated to be negative. The resulting truncation
should reflect the economic beliefs that an increase in the cost of bunker fuel
causes a reduction in the volume of shipping in the commodity markets and
hence in the rea variable.
The parameter bqp represents the reciprocal of the short run price elasticity of
oil demand. Consistent with the empirical literature on estimating the price
elasticity of oil demand we put a student t(cpq, σpq, νpq) prior distribution with
mode at c31 = −5, scale parameter σ31 = 0.2 , degrees of freedom ν31 = 3 and
truncated to be negative. Our prior density for bqp implies a short-run demand
elasticity centred around 0.2 in the absolute value.
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The parameter bp,rea denotes the effect of changes in economic activity (mea-
sured by rea index) on the price of crude oil. Since we do not have a direct
measure of industrial production we are only able to postulate a positive feed-
back from real economic activity to the price of oil. Therefore we put a rel-
ative uninformative student t(cp,rea, σp,rea, νp,rea) prior distribution with mode
at cp,rea = 0, scale parameter σp,rea = 0.5, degrees of freedom νp,rea = 3 and
truncated to be positive.
Finally, for the parameters of the oil futures-spot spread equation we assign
completely uninformative prior student t distribution, with location parameter
ci = 0, scale σi = 0.5 and degrees of freedom ν = 3.
The identification structure implies also three exclusion restrictions. The first-
two involve the elements of the structural oil supply equation and they postu-
late that bq,rea = bq,s = 0. The last exclusion restriction implies that the real
economic activity is not directly affected by the oil futures-spot spread, that
is brea,s = 0.
The last candidate is the 4-variable model with inventories and measure-
ment error as proposed by Baumeister and Hamilton (2017).
The set of aggregate variables includes monthly data on global crude oil pro-
duction, economic activity, real price of oil and inventories. The authors replace
the proxy for the real economic activity proposed by Kilian (2009) with a direct
measure of world industrial production index (WIP ). This variable is based
on the OECD and six majors other countries’ as constructed in Baumeister
and Kilian (2016). The following indicator allows to exploit more precisely
information about the income elasticity of oil demand.
Moreover M5 includes the WTI spot price in order to increase the size of the
dataset and use observation from an earlier sample (1958:1-1975:1) to further
inform the prior of the real price of oil. The latter is based on the US refiner’s
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imported acquisition cost.
Analogous to the previous models, even in this case the identification structure
implies a set of priors distribution for the elements of the matrix B0 which is
designed to capture the structural relation among the endogenous variables.
In addition the Bayesian procedure accounts for the presence of measurement
errors which might arise from the inclusion of the OECD crude oil data as a
proxy for the global crude oil inventories.
For further details about the identification scheme of M5 the reader is referred
to Baumeister and Hamilton (2017).
1.6.2 Measuring the global price elasticities of oil de-
mand and oil supply
The short-run price supply and demand elasticity plays a crucial role in
determining the contribution of each structural shock on the global price of
crude oil.
According to Hamilton (2009a) the cost of refined products are about twice
the price of crude oil. This conjecture suggests a value for the global price
elasticity of oil demand larger than what implied by the US price elasticity of
gasoline demand.
Table 1.3 reports some estimates of own-price elasticities of U.S. household
demand for gasoline, distinguishing between short-long horizons and single-
systems equation models.
Traditional studies on estimating the short-run price gasoline demand elastic-
ity are based on single-equation estimation.
In this context, conventional OLS methodology is wrong because model vio-
lates the orthogonality conditions between predictors and errors term. This
yields with biased response of gasoline consumption (production) to changes
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Table 1.3: Benchmark elasticities
Price demand elasticity
Long-run estimate Methodology Study
-0.81 Cross-sectional analysis Hausman and Newey (1995)
-0.9 Cross-sectional analysis Yatchew and No (2001)
-0.86 Survey Dahl and Sterner (1991)
-0.58 Meta-analysis Espey (1998)
-0.77 Survey Graham and Glaister (2003)
-0.84 Meta-analysis Brons et al. (2008)
Short-run estimate Methodology Study
Single equations
-0.26 Survey Dahl and Sterner (1991)
-0.07 Cross-section analysis Hughes et al. (2008)
-0.22 Panel data analysis Gelman et al. (2016)
-0.37 Panel data analysis Coglianese et al. (2017)
-0.35 Simulation analysis Bento et al. (2009)
-1.14 Panel-data and time-series analysis Davis and Kilian (2011)
System of equations
-0.60 Panel data analysis Nicol (2003)
-0.70 Panel data analysis Oladosu (2003)
-0.46 Panel data analysis West and Williams (2004)
-0.75 Panel data analysis West and Williams (2007)
-0.50 Cross-sectional analysis Tiezzi and Verde (2014)
Price supply elasticity
Estimate Methodology Study
0.0258 Historical experience Kilian and Murphy (2012)
0.11 Panel data analysis Caldara et al. (2017)
in gasoline price. 32
A natural solution of the endogenity problem is the use of instrumental vari-
able for gasoline price. As pointed out by Coglianese et al. (2017), the choice
of a proper instrument, that is correlated with the price of oil and uncorrelated
with shocks to demand or supply is not trivial.
An analysis by Hughes et al. (2008) point out that, empirical results of Dahl
and Sterner (1991) who use prices of refinery products to instrument gasoline
32The simultaneity bias arises when the dependent variable, consumption or production,
is jointly determined with the explanatory variable, price of gasoline, typically through an
equilibrium mechanism.
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prices are misleading. The reason is that, prices of refinery products do not
represent accurate instruments because they are positively correlated with the
price of gasoline but also affected by gasoline demand shocks. To deal with
this issue, Hughes et al. (2008) propose to instrument the price of gasoline with
changes in global crude oil production occurring in Venezuela due to the oil
strike workers. A study by Davis and Kilian (2011) use the changes in gaso-
line taxes as a strong and exogenous instrument of gasoline price. They find
out that in the short run the estimate of price elasticity of gasoline demand is
-1.14, a puzzling high value.
Coglianese et al. (2017) show that retail consumers and gasoline station op-
erators anticipate the effect of taxes on gasoline prices increasing the gasoline
purchase during the period immediately before the implementation of taxa-
tion. As a consequence the gasoline tax is not exogenous.
To overcome this issue, Coglianese et al. (2017) propose to instrument the
gasoline prices by including one lead before the tax hikes and one lag in the
month of the tax increase. The following lag-specification allows to control for
unconventional higher and lower expected purchases, respectively.
In related work, Caldara et al. (2017) propose to use exogenous drops in oil
consumption occurred in other countries as instrumental variables for oil prices.
The idea is that, changes in price of oil explained by other countries are in-
dependent from changes in amount of consumption or production related to
the country of interest. Some examples of exogenous shocks discussed in their
analysis refer to geopolitical events, political unrest and earthquake or hurri-
canes.
In this way, the authors obtain estimates of short-run price demand (supply)
elasticity by regressing consumption (production) in each country against the
fitted price obtained from the first stage regression. The price supply and
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demand elasticity resulting from the following estimation is 0.07 and -0.07,
respectively. These values represent the elasticities target that are used as ex-
ternal information to solve the identification problem in the SVAR framework.
In particular, their strategy selects a pair of admissible elasticities by mini-
mizing the Euclidean distance between the target elasticities and the VAR-
admissible elasticities. The resulting median global crude oil supply and de-
mand elasticities are 0.11 and -0.13, respectively.
Interestingly, global elasticities estimated from system of equations are higher
than the elasticity obtained by using a single linear approach, consistent with
the narrative in Tiezzi and Verde (2014) and Coglianese et al. (2017).
For our purposes, we should focus on the values referring to a system-based
estimate because in principle single equation models tend to find lower price
elasticities (in absolute value) than those works including system endogenous
models.
This finding is consistent with early studies by Nicol (2003); Oladosu (2003);
West and Williams (2004) and more recent works by West and Williams (2007);
Tiezzi and Verde (2014); Kilian and Murphy (2014). Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show
values of the global price demand and supply elasticity implied by each model
reported in table 1.2.
In this analysis, we distinguish between the elasticity estimates inferred from
the parameters of the structural equations, embodied in B0, and those obtained
from the impact multiplier matrix B−10 . The latter represents the reference ap-
proach for our discussion since the elasticity implied by B−10 is available for all
models.
As pointed out by Kilian and Murphy (2014), the identification of the de-
mand elasticity requires an exogenous shift of the contemporaneous supply
curve along the contemporaneous demand curve, within the context of a struc-
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Table 1.4: Elasticity of global oil demand
Short-run global price demand elasticity
Structural matrix B0
Elasticity
SVAR models 50thperc 16thperc. 84thperc.
Benchmark model (M0) n.a n.a n.a
Sign restriction model (M1) n.a n.a n.a
Recursive model (M2) -1.36 -2.23 -0.97
Recursive model (M3) -1.18 -1.85 -0.86
Non-recursive model (M4) -0.20 -0.21 -0.19
Non-recursive model (M5) -0.35 -0.51 -0.24
Impact multiplier matrix B−10
Elasticity in use Elasticity in production
SVAR models Estimate Estimate 16thperc. 84thperc.
Benchmark model (M0) n.a -0.54 -0.13 -0.75
Sign restriction model (M1) -0.35 -0.46 -0.37 -1.20
Recursive model (M2) n.a -1.63 -1.03 -3.52
Recursive model (M3) n.a -1.14 -0.81 -1.85
Non-recursive model (M4) n.a -0.79 -0.51 -1.29
Non-recursive model (M5) n.a -0.46 -0.35 -0.59
tural model.33
As a result, we can interpret the ratio between the impact responses of global
oil production and real price of oil to an oil supply disruption, as the short-run
price global demand elasticity. This is also denoted by oil demand elasticity in
production, consistent with the narrative in Kilian and Murphy (2014).
Moreover, the authors propose an alternative measure of elasticity, accounting
for the role of inventories in smoothing oil consumption. The latter is called
oil demand elasticity in use. Notice that, to get an estimate of price demand
elasticity in use we need to include the proxy for global crude oil inventories in
the set of endogenous variables. For this reason, this analysis focuses on the
price demand elasticity in production.
33Analogous reasoning is for the supply elasticity. Specifically, the supply elasticity re-
quires an exogenous shift of the contemporaneous demand curve along the contemporaneous
supply curve. Since we disentangle the demand for crude oil in three economic different ways,
we yield three different values for the elasticity of oil supply.
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Table 1.5: Elasticity of global oil supply
Short-run global price supply elasticity
Elasticity based on structural matrix B0
SVAR models 50thpercentile 16thpercentile 84thpercentile
Benchmark model (M0) n.a n.a n.a
Sign restriction model (M1) n.a n.a n.a
Recursive model (M2) 0 0 0
Recursive model (M3) 0 0 0
Non-recursive model (M4) 0.02 0.02 0.03
Non-recursive model (M5) 0.15 0.09 0.22
Elasticity based on impact multiplier matrix B−10 , in response to
Aggregate demand shock
SVAR models Estimate 16thpercentile 84thpercentile
Benchmark model (M0) 0.06 0.02 0.05
Sign restriction model (M1) 0.01 0.02 0.07
Recursive model (M2) 0 0 0
Recursive model (M3) 0 0 0
Non-recursive model (M4) 0.02 0.01 0.02
Non-recursive model (M5) 0.12 0.10 0.13
Precautionary demand shock
SVAR models Estimate 16thpercentile 84thpercentile
Benchmark model (M0) 0.07 0.04 0.07
Sign restriction model (M1) 0.02 0.02 0.07
Recursive model (M2) 0 0 0
Recursive model (M3) 0 0 0
Non-recursive model (M4) 0.02 0.01 0.03
Non-recursive model (M5) 0.11 0.09 0.15
Residual demand shock
SVAR models Estimate 16thpercentile 84thpercentile
Benchmark model (M0) -0.06 -0.81 0.04
Sign restriction model (M1) 0.27 1.54 1.58
Recursive model (M2) 0 0 0
Recursive model (M3) 0 0 0
Non-recursive model (M4) 0.02 0.01 0.03
Non-recursive model (M5) 0.12 0.09 0.14
The resulting estimates of oil supply and oil demand elasticity for the bench-
mark model are in absolute value 0.06 and 0.54, respectively. These estimates
are consistent with analogous studies reported in table 1.3.
Figure 1.4 depicts the impact price elasticity of oil supply normalized to 0.0258,
for the set identified model discussed in Kilian and Murphy (2014), under its
original identification. We highlight that, the numerical values of this ra-
tio associated with aggregate and precautionary demand shocks are less than
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one. Conversely, the normalized price supply elasticity in response to resid-
ual demand shocks can be larger than its postulated value, depending on the
structural model of interest.
For some models, the price supply elasticity in response to a positive residual
demand shock is 40 times larger than what originally imposed. This result
casts doubts on the accuracy of price supply elasticity. Therefore, in this anal-
Figure 1.4: Kilian and Murphy (2014)’s set identified model
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Note: Following the original identification strategy discussed in Kilian and Murphy
(2014) we obtain a set of 16 structural models conditional on the least squares
estimate of the reduced-form. The authors focus on model number six. This model
yields an impact price elasticity of oil demand in use closest to the posterior median
of this elasticity among the candidate models that satisfy all identifying restrictions.
ysis we impose an upper bound restriction on the ratio between the impact
responses of oil production and real price of oil to residual demand shocks.
Caldara et al. (2017) prove the existence of an inverse and non-linear relation
between oil demand and oil supply elasticity. In some cases, the empirical rela-
tion provides economically implausible estimates of short-run price supply and
demand elasticities. This analysis offers supporting evidence in this regard,
especially for recursive models.
One might ask what the consequences of Cholesky identification on the eco-
nomic results might be, given the simplicity of this traditional approach. We
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Figure 1.5: The implied global oil demand elasticity for recursive SVAR models
Note: Baseline prior (solid red curve) and posterior (blue histograms) distributions
concerning bq,p and the impact price elasticity of oil demand.
have two comments to make on this. First, zero-restrictions might represent
too strong assumptions in the real world. Second, recursive oil market VAR
models might induce implausible values for the short-run price demand elas-
ticity.
As regards the last point, Baumeister and Hamilton (2017) provide evidence
that the SVAR model discussed in Kilian (2009) implies a very elastic values
for the oil demand elasticity. They show that the posterior distribution of the
reciprocal of the price elasticity of oil demand is concentrated between -0.6
and +0.2. This means that the demand function implied by model discussed
in Kilian (2009) is not only very elastic but it can be also upward-sloping.
In sum, the dynamic responses of the endogenous variables to each structural
shock for recursive models might be misleading.
This issue can be easily overcome by adopting an identification scheme based
on sign restrictions that allows to restrict the impact price elasticity of oil de-
mand to be negative. However, in this analysis we show that, by including the
forward-looking measure as third variable in the recursive SVAR model, the
probability of observing bqp > 0 falls dramatically.
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Figure 1.6: Prior against posterior distribution of some elements of B0 for
model with oil futures-spot spread (M4)
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concerning the structural parameters for model M4.
Figure 1.5 shows that, in both models the posterior distribution for bq,p has
most of its mass for negative values. Our result provides evidence that the
dynamic responses of recursive oil market SVAR models imply economic plau-
sible sign for the oil demand elasticity. However, the underlying models lead
us to conclude that the crude oil demand is extremely elastic in response to
unexpected changes in the price of oil.
Figure 1.6 plots both the prior and posterior distribution for some of the struc-
tural elements of model M4. Four basic features emerge. First, the posterior
median of the short-run price elasticity of oil supply, bq,p is 0.024. The value
is smaller than the estimate reported by Baumeister and Hamilton (2017) but
it is consistent with the results of Kilian and Murphy (2014). Second, our
prior beliefs about the short-run price elasticity of oil demand is economically
plausible. This is confirmed by the posterior median of bp,q which is -0.20, a
value in accordance with other empirical results. Third, most of the probability
mass for bp,rea is from 1.2 to 2. This is consistent with the result of Kilian and
Murphy (2012), who find that the effects of real economic activity on the price
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of oil is not zero (as postulated by Kilian (2009)) but equals to 2.2. Finally,
the posterior distribution for brea,p provides empirical evidence of the absence
of direct feedback from bunker fuel price to the real economic activity index.
1.6.3 A comparison based on the impulse responses of
price of oil and forward-looking variables to each
structural shock
The aim of this subsection is to compare the impulse responses of the real
price of oil and the forward-looking variables between M0 and the alternative
models reported in table 1.2.
It is important to note that the economic meaning of the first-three structural
shocks and their effect on the variables of interest should be similar across
models. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 depict the impulse responses of real price of oil
and forward-looking variables for each model discussed in this analysis. 34
The impact price responses to the first-three structural shocks implied by M0
are qualitatively similar both in terms of shape and magnitude to those re-
ported by M1. The main difference between M0 and M1 is the impulse re-
sponse of the price of oil to residual structural shocks. In model M1, a positive
residual structural shock causes an instantaneous rise in the demand for stor-
age followed by a reduction in the real price of oil. According to Kilian and
Murphy (2014) the economic meaning and the transmission mechanism of the
residual structural shock is not simple to figure out.
The pairwise comparison of M0 and M2 reported in figure 1.7 should be dis-
34As regards M1, dotted black line is the impulse response estimate of the real price of oil
under the original specification by Kilian and Murphy (2014). While solid black line denotes
the impulse response estimate of the real price of oil under the revised identification of the
Kilian and Murphy’s model as discussed in section 1.6.1.
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cussed with caution since the models provide two different estimates of their
oil demand elasticity. For the benchmark model the impact price elasticity of
oil demand is 0.54 in absolute value which is consistent with the results of Ser-
letis et al. (2010); Guerrieri and Bodenstein (2012); Baumeister and Peersman
(2013) and Kilian and Murphy (2014).
Conversely, the median of the posterior distribution of the price elasticity of
oil demand implied by M2 is around -1.36 which is not truly representative
of the global market for crude oil. The benchmark model implies somewhat
larger impact responses of the price of oil to oil supply disruptions and positive
aggregate demand shocks. This is not surprising given their differences in term
of short-run price elasticities of oil demand. Positive precautionary demand
shocks have similar effects on the magnitude of the price of oil.
Finally the residual structural shocks of M0 and M2 do not reflect the same
economic interpretation providing different empirical impact estimates of the
real price of oil.
Figure 1.8 shows the impulse responses function of recursive model with crude
oil inventories (M3). In particular, an oil supply disruption and a positive
shock to aggregate demand causes an instantaneous increase in the real price
of oil, as grounded on the theory. On the other hand, a positive precaution-
ary demand shock causes an increase in the level of inventories followed by a
contemporaneous decline in the price of oil. This is clearly at odds with the
economic theory.
The pairwise comparison of M0 and M4 reported in figure 1.7 exhibit striking
qualitative similarities with the responses of oil price and the oil futures-spot
spread to each structural shock.
Finally the pairwise comparison of M0 and M5 shows that both models pro-
duce similarly price response estimates to positive aggregate and precautionary
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demand shocks. Analogous results hold in case of positive shocks to financial
and inventory markets. As a consequence both structural shocks cause the real
price of oil to rise.
In the end, the models in question provide qualitatively similar impact price re-
sponses to each structural shock confirming their accuracy to describe properly
the effect of residual structural shock on the real price of crude oil.
1.6.4 A qualitative rank of SVAR models for global crude
oil markets
In this subsection we provide a qualitative method to rank oil market VAR
models on the basis of their impulse response functions. In the first place,
we need an objective criterion defining rules for the evaluation of all impact
responses. The criterion discussed in this work consists of four main points.
First, the impulse responses function have to imply plausible values of oil sup-
ply and oil demand elasticities.
Second, the sign of the impact responses need to follow the economic theory.
Third, for a generic i, j impact response denoted by B−10(ij) , we prefer B
−1
0(ij)
6= 0
than B−10(ij) = 0. The latter arises due to exclusion restrictions imposed on the
elements of the structural matrix. In general, researchers aim to relax zero
restrictions because they are based on strong assumptions for the global crude
oil markets.
Fourth, if an impact response is grounded on the theory and its credible region
(CR) excludes zero as a possible outcome then it be highly rated. On the
other hand, if an impact response is an odds with its theoretical framework
and it excludes the zero-value in the corresponding credible set then it will be
lower rated. It is important to highlight that the ordering of these four points
matters for the final rank. Table 1.6 shows the evaluation criterion with the
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Table 1.6: Evaluation criterion for the impact responses
Rating for B−10(ij) Outcomes for B
−1
0(ij)
Rank Score
A Economic theory B−10(ij) /∈ 0 0 /∈ CR 1st 5
B Economic theory B−10(ij) /∈ 0 0 ∈ CR 2nd 4
C Economic theory B−10(ij) ∈ 0 0 ∈ CR 3rd 3
D Non-economic theory B−10(ij) /∈ 0 0 ∈ CR 4th 2
E Non-economic theory B−10(ij) /∈ 0 0 /∈ CR 5th 1
Note: In table 1.6 there are five different types of rating with their associated scores.
Table 1.7: The economic sign of the impact responses
Variables I shock II shock III shock IV shock
Oil production - + + ()
Economic activity - + - ()
Price of oil + + + ()
Forward-looking variables:
Inventories - - + ()
Oil futures-spot spread - - - ()
Note: The SVAR models identify four structural shocks. The first shock (I) is a
negative oil supply shock. The second (II) is a positive shock to aggregate demand.
The third shock (III) represents a positive precautionary demand shock. The fourth
shock is a positive residual (or idiosyncratic) structural shock (IV) whose meaning
is strictly related to the specific model.
relative scores for the impact responses of the SVAR models covered in this
analysis.35 The economic theory is summarized in table 1.7 and it reports the
expected outcomes on the elements of the impact multiplier matrix, in accor-
dance with empirical works proposed in this field.
For example, let us suppose that we are interested in assessing the accuracy
of the impact response of the crude oil inventory to the first structural shock.
It is widely accepted that a negative supply shock causes an instantaneous
reduction in the global oil production, economic activity and a rise in the real
price of oil. Therefore the role of storage for consumption smoothing will imply
35The fourth shock is a positive idiosyncratic structural shock whose meaning is strictly
related to the specific model. For this reason we are not able to provide a common sign of
the impact response of the endogenous variables to residual demand shocks.
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Table 1.8: Ranking of the impact responses
SVAR
models
M0
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
Total Responses
I structural shock
A B C D E Rank
4 0 0 0 0 1st
4 0 0 0 0 1st
2 0 0 2 0 6th
2 1 0 1 0 5th
3 1 0 0 0 3rd
3 0 0 1 0 4th
18 2 0 4 0
II structural shock
A B C D E Rank
4 0 0 0 0 1st
3 1 0 0 0 3rd
3 0 1 0 0 5th
2 1 1 0 0 4th
4 0 0 0 0 1st
3 0 0 1 0 6st
19 2 2 1 0
SVAR
models
M0
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
Total Responses
III structural shock
A B C D E Rank
4 0 0 0 0 1st
4 0 0 0 0 1st
2 0 2 0 0 4th
1 0 2 1 0 5th
4 0 0 0 0 1st
2 1 0 0 1 6th
17 1 4 1 1
IV structural shock
A B C D E Rank
2 2 0 0 0 3rd
0 4 0 0 0 4th
1 0 3 0 0 6th
1 0 3 0 0 6th
4 0 0 0 0 1st
4 0 0 0 0 1st
12 6 6 0 0
SVAR
models
M0
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
Total Responses
All structural shocks
A B C D E Score Rank
14 2 0 0 0 78/80 2nd
11 5 0 0 0 75/80 3rd
8 0 6 2 0 62/80 5th
6 2 6 2 0 60/80 6th
15 1 0 0 0 79/80 1st
12 1 0 2 1 69/80 4th
66 11 12 6 1
a reduction in the level of crude oil inventories, irrespective the methodology
employed to solve the identification problem.
In the beginning, for every model we assign a score of each impulse response
estimate in order to provide a provisional ranking.
Tables 1.8 reports the absolute frequencies of the rating assigned to each im-
pact response. Since we have six oil market VAR models and four structural
shocks overall we evaluate ninety-six impulse response estimates.
The instantaneous effect of the first structural shock (oil supply shock) on the
endogenous variables are properly explained by non-recursive models, espe-
cially for those with identification scheme based on sign restrictions on the
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elements of the impact multiplier matrix.
As regards the recursive models, an oil supply disruption represents the only
structural shock that can be transmitted without imposing zero restrictions on
the set of endogenous variables.
Moreover, recursive models including oil futures-spot spread and crude oil in-
ventories as forward-looking variables have an half and a quarter of their im-
pact responses in rating D, respectively. Overall, 75% and 8% of the impact
responses of an oil supply shock to all variables are rated A and B respectively,
while the remaining responses are rated D.
The contemporaneous effect of the second structural shock (aggregate demand
shock) on the endogenous variables is very clearly explained by all models dis-
cussed in this analysis. Overall, 80% of the impact responses of each variable
are rated A, 4% B and the remaining 8% respectively C and D. Neither of the
impact responses are rated E.
The impact responses of all endogenous variables to the third structural shock
(precautionary demand for crude oil) are very accurate for non-recursive mod-
els, except for the model proposed by Baumeister and Hamilton (2017). The
latter have some limits in explaining properly the effects of shocks, specific to
oil markets, on the set of endogenous variables.
In particular, the impact response of crude oil inventories to positive precau-
tionary demand shocks is negative. This represents the lowest rating among
all models discussed in this analysis. As regards the effects of residual struc-
tural shocks, non-recursive models, with identification strategy based on prior
density functions on the elements of the structural matrix B0, provide very ac-
curate impact responses (100% rated A). In sum, 50% of the impact responses
of each variable are rated A, and the remaining equal shares are rated B and
C. The final ranking for the assessment of the impact responses is reported
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Table 1.9: Ranking SVAR models
SVAR Supply elasticity Short-run demand elasticity Score Final
models Estimate 0 6= 0 Estimate (0; 0.6) [0.6; 1) [1; +∞) IRFs rank
M0 0.06 X -0.54 X 78/80 1st
M1 0.10 X -0.46 X 75/80 2nd
M5 0.11 X -0.46 X 69/80 3rd
M4 0.02 X -0.79 X 79/80 4th
M2 0 X -1.63 X 62/80 5th
M3 0 X -1.14 X 60/80 6th
in bottom panel of table 1.8. This rank suggests that alternative methods of
relaxing zero-restrictions improve the accuracy of the impact responses pro-
viding clearer explanations for the transmission of oil price shocks. Table 1.8
also shows that, under the same methodology, SVAR models with oil futures-
spot spread provide higher score-rating than those including a proxy for global
crude oil inventories.
In conclusion, we are able to provide a final rank in accordance with economic
plausible estimates of oil supply and oil demand elasticities. On a practical
level, implausible values for the price supply elasticities are specific to SVAR
recursive models. According to table 1.3, a plausible range of price demand
elasticity in the short and long run might be (0; 0.6) and [0.6; 1), respectively.
In contrast, the last interval of table 1.9 is [1;∞) but it implies very implau-
sible elastic oil demand curve.
As reported in table 1.9, the short-run price demand elasticity implied by the
benchmark model M0 and the non-recursive models M1 and M5 are in the first
range. As regards, M4, its estimate of elasticity of oil demand is within the
second interval. Finally, both M2 and M3 imply unrealistic estimates of their
oil demand elasticities. Once we have classified all models according to their
oil demand and oil supply elasticity estimates, the final rank can be obtained
by sorting each model from the highest to the lowest score.
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1.7 Robustness checks
The first robustness check relies on the work of Baumeister and Hamilton
(2017), who uses the world industrial production index 36 as a proxy for global
real output. As a second robustness check, we use the Brent spot price as a
proxy for the global price of crude oil.
Figure 1.9 depicts two alternative proxies for the worldwide economic activity.
Figure 1.9: Global real economic activity measures
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Note: Pink and green lines denote the real economic activity indicator (REA: Kil-
ian’s index) and the world industrial production (WIP) index, respectively. Since
2006, the WIP have included additional data for the non-OECD countries like,
China, India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa and Indonesia.
The first indicator is the real economic activity index derived from the cost
of international shipping. The second is the industrial production for OECD
and non-OECD countries. Recently, the Kilian’s index have exhibited some
erratic behaviour that is hard to square with smooth fluctuations in the global
business cycle. For example, the drop in the real economic activity index in
the beginning of 2016. This decline is qualitatively similar to that reported
36An updated version of the WIP has been proposed by Baumeister and Hamilton (2017)
and it can be downloaded from the following link: https://sites.google.com/site/
cjsbaumeister/research
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during the financial crisis. The main potential factors that might explain the
increased in volatility in the aftermath of the financial crisis might be related
to (1) the dependence on the cost of bunker fuel and hence on the price of oil,
(2) the ship-building and scrapping cycle and (3) the increase in exposure of
idiosyncratic shocks.
As regards the first point, in section 1.6.2 we have shown that the posterior
distribution for brea,p of the non-recursive model M4 fails to take into account
a direct feedback from price of oil to real economic activity index. This is not
surprising since this indicator has been recently derived from the Baltic Dry
Index (BDI). The latter is by definition independent from the fuel cost.
On the other hand, the feedback from price of oil to rea might occur indirectly
through the effects of aggregate demand shocks. In order to investigate the
indirect feedback we should know the fuel cost share in the bulk dry cargo
shipping. Fuel cost share represent private information which are difficult to
retrieve.37
The second point refers to the role played by the ship-building and scrapping
cycle. This is explained by the fact that, high shipping rates provide incentives
for ship-building causing the size of fleet to rise and the volume of shipping
rates to decline. However, it does not represent an attractive and solid expla-
nation confirmed by the fact that increases in the amount of cargo vessels take
years and the excess capacity can be absorbed through a substitution effect.
The latter implies that less efficient bulk dry cargo vessels are scrapped in
favour of new fleet.
37Kilian and Zhou (2017) discuss the case of a specific container carrier for which the
impact of bunker fuel on the cost of dry bulk shipping was 25%, during the period 2014-
2015. The authors state that, assuming a perfect pass-through, a 50% increase in the price
oil crude oil would cause a 12.5% increase in the cost of shipping. However, this example
might be not representative for the global cost of dry bulk shipping, since it involves only
one shipping company. Therefore, the accuracy of the percentages of bunker fuel on the cost
of dry bulk shipping requires further investigation.
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Moreover, the qualitative analysis proposed by Kilian and Zhou (2017) shows
that fluctuations in the Kilian’s index during 2010-2016 was mainly driven by
the demand side of the shipping market given the fact that the supply of bulk
dry carries did not reflect significantly changes.
One last factor undermining the accuracy of rea is its exposure to idiosyncratic
shocks. In response to this issue, Kilian and Zhou (2017) shows that almost
60% of the decline in the real economic activity index occurred in early 2016
was explained by a global economic slowdown and the remaining fraction was
related to idiosyncratic shocks in the market for iron ore.
The Kilian’s index is not the only variable of economic activity for modelling
the transmission of oil price shocks.
There are alternative measures for this purpose such as proxies for global real
GDP, global industrial production, global steel production and commodity
price index derived from a factor analysis. On a practical level, not all of these
indicators are suitable for modelling the global price of crude oil.
For example, the “Quarterly World real GDP can” be considered a good proxy
for global real output. However, this indicator has two drawbacks. First, it is
available in quarterly frequency. Second, it does not reflect a stable relation-
ship between changes in the real GDP and in the real commodity prices. This
is also true for the most recent proxy for world real GDP expressed in monthly
frequency.
A proxy for global real economic activity based on the aggregation of crude
steel production has been proposed by Ravazzolo and Vespignani (2017). The
authors exploit the role of steel as relevant input for many industries including
constructions, transportation and manufacturing. The index offers several ad-
vantages very close to the Kilian’s index. For example, it represents a global
measure, it does not require a purchasing power parity weight across countries
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and it is a leading indicator with respect to real output.
On the other hand, this indicator presents two shortcomings. First, it is sen-
sitive to any change in the number of steel-producing countries. Second, it
might be over exposed to idiosyncratic supply shocks.
Analogous to the Kilian’s index, idiosyncratic supply shocks can undermine the
accuracy of the macroeconomic indicator. For this reason, researchers derive
economic indicators by applying a factor analysis to a wide range of monthly
commodity prices. This method allows to average out the idiosyncratic effects
for each commodity by exploiting the cross-sectional dimension of the data.
However, the most relevant drawback of such approach consists of the selec-
tion of the types of commodity prices to include in the factor analysis.
In principle, one should choose a basket of commodity prices by minimizing
potential idiosyncratic shocks transmission from vertical integrated markets,
as discussed in Alquist and Coibion (2014). The feasibility of this criterion
remains an open question.
In the first robustness check we use the growth-rate of industrial production
index as a proxy for global real output. This variable has two relevant short-
comings. First, it includes data for six non-OECD emerging economies (China,
India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa and Indonesia) only prior to 2006, exclud-
ing the period in which China played a crucial role in driving the commodity
prices. Second, depending on the transformations applied to the index, it
might provide different paths. Specifically, log-linearly and detrended indus-
trial production variable provides larger global economic slowdown than itself
expressed in growth rate.
In this section we check whether the empirical results provided by model 1.1
are robust to changes in the variables of global business cycle and real price of
crude oil. Therefore we estimate two alternative configurations of the bench-
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mark SVAR model. The first specification includes the same variables except
for the real economic activity index proposed by Kilian (2009). Thus, the Kil-
ian’s index is replaced with an updated measure of world industrial production
as a proxy for global economic activity. As regards the second specification,
the RACi is the only variable replaced with Brent spot price of oil.
In section 1.5 we have shown that, unexpected increases in the real price of
oil driven by negative oil supply shocks and positive shocks to aggregate and
precautionary demand for crude oil are associated with a drop in the oil futures-
spot spread, on impact. On the other hand, positive financial market shocks
cause an instantaneous increase in both the real price of oil and the oil futures-
spot spread.
Figure 1.10 plots the price and spread responses to one-standard deviation
structural shocks, for robustness checks. Three basic features emerge.
First, all impact responses are grounded on the economic theory. Second, the
Figure 1.10: Structural impulse responses for robustness check
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Note: Red and green solid lines denote the RACi and Brent oil spot prices response
estimates implied by specifications 1 and 2, respectively. Blue line refers to the RACi
response based on the benchmark model. Analogous explanation is for the impulse
responses of oil futures-spot spread, which are represented by bar charts.
row upper-panel of figure 1.10 shows that, in the benchmark model, a positive
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economic activity shock causes a smaller but much more persistent increase in
the price of oil than specification 1.
As opposed, the rise in the price of crude triggered by a positive financial mar-
ket shock is smaller in specification 1 than the benchmark model. The latter
provides a peak price response after 4 months.
Notice that, the effects of an oil supply disruption and a positive precaution-
ary demand shock on the global price of crude oil are similar in both models.
Moreover, the impulse response of the oil-futures spot spread to each structural
shock remains robust to changes in the economic activity measures.
Overall, the results obtained from the first specification exhibit striking quali-
tative similarities with the responses of oil price and the oil futures-spot spread
implied by the benchmark model.
Finally, row bottom-panel of figure 1.10 suggests that the type of global price
of crude oil matters for drawing conclusions in modelling oil price shocks.
If Brent prices were interpreted as international price of oil then the implied
impulse response functions would not be as clear as in the case of US cost of
imported crude oil (RACi).
The response of Brent spot price to an oil supply disruption exhibits a fast
decline in the first three months. A similar picture emerges in case of positive
aggregate demand shocks.
These results suggest that the shape of the impulse response of Brent and RACi
to oil supply shocks and aggregate demand shocks are different. In contrast,
the path of price responses of RACi and Brent to precautionary demand and
financial market shocks are qualitatively identical.
Despite a widespread beliefs that Brent price represents the international
benchmark 38 of the spot price of oil, the empirical evidence shown in fig-
38Oil experts, Central Banks, and media consider Brent spot price as a reliable proxy for
the global price of oil. The main reason is that it represents a reference price for North-west
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ure 1.10 does not find sufficient support of it. In conclusion, we believe that
the RACi is likely to be a better proxy for the price of crude oil in the global
markets.
Figure 1.11 allows us to assess the quantitative importance of the structural
shocks at each point in time, under robustness checks.
The effects of supply and precautionary demand shocks on oil prices (blue vs
green lines) are very similar.
The impacts of aggregate demand shocks on RACi might be larger than Brent,
during 2006-2008. Finally, the effects of financial market shocks on oil prices
is not unique. In particular, 1.11 depicts higher price level for Brent and lower
price level for RACi between 2008 and mid 2014.
It is not surprising to find out that the impact of aggregate demand shocks
are different depending on the proxy (blue vs red lines) for global economic
activity is applied to the analysis.
During the world financial crisis the aggregate demand shock played a crucial
role in explaining the collapse of oil prices. The estimated historical decom-
position associated with specification 1 (red line) shows that the slump in the
real price of oil is primarily driven by a slowdown of the global economy.
Between 2006 and mid 2008, the effects of aggregate demand shocks measured
by the Kilian’s index plays a more relevant role in explaining the surge of the
price of oil rather than its decline occurred beyond June 2008.
Finally, the recent global economic slowdown is associated with a decline in
the real price of oil. The magnitude of this drop depends on the variables used
to measure the global business cycle. As a result, the debate on which type of
proxy for global real output should be included in VAR modelling is still an
open question.
Europe, all West African, Mediterranean and recently for some South-east Asia crude oil.
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In this respect, it is better to separate the contribution of aggregate demand
shocks derived from the commodity price indices (i.e. the Kilian’s index) to
the real output measures (i.e. industrial production) because their economic
meaning might be similar but not identical.
We believe that commodity price indices are linked to cost of production while
real output measures are associated with the values of production. Therefore,
it is not surprising to find out that the effects of aggregate demand shocks on
the global price of crude oil are different in timing and magnitude depending
on the types of proxy for global real economic activity.
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1.8 Conclusions
There are two main important features in modelling the global price of
crude oil. First, the selection of a proper set of endogenous variables. Second,
the choice of the identification scheme that is applied to identify the structural
shocks.
To our knowledge, we propose a model that differs for both aspects from those
specifications proposed in the previous literature.
Most studies show SVAR models that include a physical proxy for crude oil
inventories to describe the forward-looking behaviours of the oil traders.
In this analysis instead, we replace a physical proxy for global oil stocks with a
financial measure of forward-looking expectations: the oil futures-spot spread.
The latter is considered a proxy for the convenience yield but expressed with
an opposite sign.
We show that the main benefits of using the oil futures-spot spread is to es-
tablish a direct link between physical and financial markets within the context
of SVAR model. This allows to derive the real time market value of crude oil
inventories held anywhere on Earth.
The other relevant contribution of this model consists of the economic inter-
pretation of the residual structural shock. This can be viewed as an additional
source of explanation which is able to capture the effects of oil price specula-
tion and other forms of financial incentives that are implemented to keep crude
oil off the physical market, causing the real price of oil to rise. We also show
that the oil price speculation that are identified by oil market VAR models
a’ la Kilian and Murphy are conceptually different from the financial market
shock discussed in this analysis. While both shocks are designed to capture an
instantaneous increase in the amount of oil stocks for future consumption, the
main difference stemming from the value of holding oil inventories. In the first
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case, the inventories’ build-up is explained by an increase in the demand for
storage. This causes an instantaneous reduction in the oil futures-spot spread
which is mainly driven by a rise in the convenience yield. In the second case,
the accumulation of crude oil inventories causes an increase in the oil futures-
spot spread which is mainly explained by a decline of the convenience yield.
We find evidence that financial market shocks have played an important role
in explaining the rises in the price of oil during the period 2003-2008.
Finally this work provides an investigation of different types of oil market VAR
models. The comparison based on the assessment of the impact responses for
models with the same identification strategy offers evidence that the specifica-
tion including oil futures-spot spread are better rated than those containing the
proxy for global crude oil inventories. This suggests that the oil futures-spot
spread represents a proper measure to capture the forward-looking expecta-
tions of oil traders.
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1.9 Identification strategy
Consider the generic representation of the reduced-form VAR model, with
n endogenous variables and p lags:
yt = Θ1yt−1 + Θ2yt−2 + · · ·+ Θpyt−p + ut t = 1, 2, . . . , T (1.7)
where yt is a n× 1 vector of endogenous variables, Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θp are p matri-
ces of dimension n × n and ut is a vector of non-autocorrelated reduced-form
innovations following a multivariate normal distribution ut ∼ N (0, Σu).
Σu is a n × n symmetric positive definite matrix in which the error terms of
individual equations can be simultaneously correlated. Since the reduced-form
innovations display contemporaneous correlation it is difficult to provide an
economic interpretation of the impulse responses function of the elements of
the vector ut.
On the other hand, vt denotes a n×1 vector of mutually uncorrelated structural
errors term with the following variance covariance structure: Et(vtv
′
t) = Σv,
where Σv is normalized such that Σv = In. Notice that, In represents an iden-
tity matrix of order n. The fact that, Σv is a diagonal matrix implies that the
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structural shocks can be economically interpreted in terms of shifts in demand
and supply.
The structural disturbances can be obtained as follow: ut = B˜vt, where B˜ is
a n× n matrix, such that B˜ ≡ B−10 . In other words, B˜ coincides with the im-
pact multiplier matrix and it captures the contemporaneous relations among
the endogenous variables of the VAR model.
For the construction of the impulse responses function we need to identify the
elements of the impact multiplier matrix B˜ by exploiting the algorithm dis-
cussed in Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010). This is based on a set of sign restrictions
that are directly imposed on the impulse response functions. The latter are
constructed from consistent estimates of the reduced-form slope parameters.
Therefore the set of impact multiplier matrix can be defined as the product
between B and any orthogonal square matrix D.
The matrix B is lower triangular (with all zeros above the main diagonal) such
that BB′ = Σu. In other words, B represents the factorization of Σu, such that
B = PΛ0.5, where Λ is a n× n diagonal matrix in which the elements λi’s are
the eigenvalues of Σu and the columns of the matrix P are the corresponding
eigenvectors. Thus, the variance covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR
innovation can be also expressed as Σu = PΛP
′.
The n× n matrix D is also referred to as the rotation matrix and is such that
D′D = DD′ = In, where In is an identity matrix of order n. The algorithm
proposed by Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010) consists of two stages and it can be
implemented as follow.
The first step is based on the construction of the QR decomposition of a n×n
matrix X such that X = QR where Q is an orthogonal matrix and R is up-
per triangular matrix with the elements on the main diagonal normalized to
be positive. This step must be done in a repeated sampling by drawing the
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matrix X from a independent standard normal distribution.
The second step defines D = X ′ and it involves the construction of the set of
admissible impulse responses function by using the following orthogonalization
B˜ = BD. If all the impulse response estimates satisfy the sign restrictions we
retain B˜, otherwise we discard it and we go back to the first stage.
These two steps are computationally intensive because they are iterated 5 mil-
lion of times. The estimation of the uncertainty is conducted under Bayesian
method specifying Gaussian-inverse Wishart prior distribution for the reduced
form parameters and a Haar distribution for the rotation matrix X. Thus,
the credible set of the impulse responses function is constructed by applying
the algorithm proposed by Rubio-Ramirez et al. (2010) to each draw of the
posterior distribution for the parameters of the reduced-form VAR model.
The second identification strategy refers to the algorithm proposed by Baumeis-
ter and Hamilton (2015). This approach rather than impose directly sign re-
strictions on the impulse response function it consists of a specification of set of
priors and an analysis of their implication in terms of likely impact structural
shocks. The implementation of the estimation algorithm is based on three
main steps.
First stage consists of a specification of informative prior beliefs, represented
in form of density functions about the matrix B0, the vector collecting the
structural disturbances vt and the matrix Bj, for j = 1, · · · , 12.
Prior for the elements of the contemporaneous structural matrix that are not
known with certainty are collected in a vector (α). Thus, let p(B0) be the joint
prior distribution which is made by the product of Student t distributions of
the elements collected in α. Then, we need to specify priors for the inverse
diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the structural errors D
conditional on B0. The priors for d
−1
ii (which denotes the element in row and
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column i of matrix D) conditional on B0 is given by a Γ(κi, τi) distribution, as
follow:
p(D|B0) =
n∏
i=1
p(dii|B0) (1.8)
where κi/τi and κi/τ
2
i represent the first and second moments of d
−1
ii , respec-
tively. Notice that, the parameter τi depends on B0 whereas ki does not.
Following Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) we calibrate the diagonal elements
of D from the residuals obtained by running OLS regressions from the uni-
variate autoregressive models of order 12. Moreover, we set the prior mean
for d−1ii equals to the reciprocal of the diagonal element of a matrix B0SB
′
0,
where S represents the sample variance covariance matrix of the univariate
autoregressive models performed for each time-series.
We postulate b˜i is a row vector of random structural coefficients following a
conditional normal multivariate distribution, b˜i|B0, D ∼ N (mi, diiMi) where
mi can be interpreted as the best guess about b˜i before seeing the data and Mi
represents the level of uncertainty about the standard Minnesota prior.
We follow the approach proposed by Doan et al. (1984) in which the behaviour
for a generic time-series can be represented by a random walk process with
mi = 0 and great confidence to expect that coefficients related to higher lags
are zero. 39
In the end, the joint probability distribution of the prior information about
the plausible values of the parameters is defined as:
p(B0, D,Bj) = p(B0)p(D|B0)p(Bj|B0, D) for j = 1, 2, ..., 24 (1.9)
39Following Baumeister and Hamilton (2017) we need to set three different values for the
hyper-parameters of the random walk prior for the lagged coefficients. Thus, we set the
parameter controlling the overall tightness of the prior to 0.5. We set the parameter that
governs how quickly the prior for lagged coefficients tightness to zero as lag increase to 1.
Finally, we put prior on the parameter governing the tightness of the prior for the constant
term to 100. The latter is used to make the prior on the constant term irrelevant.
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In the second step, the Baumeister and Hamilton (2015)’s algorithm searches
for a vector of values αˆ that solves numerically a maximization problem of the
target function q(α). Thus, the vector αˆ provides a reasonable guess for the
posterior mean of α while the matrix of second derivatives of q(α) with respect
to α = αˆ exploits information about the shape of the posterior distribution of
α.
In other words, the second stage sets the initial values for the elements of B0
in order to inform the random-walk Metropolis Hasting algorithm, that is per-
formed in the third step.
The last stage is designed to construct the joint posterior distribution of the
parameters, that is p(B0, D,B|YT ), where YT represents the sample-data. Ac-
cording to Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) we proceed as follow.
First, we use the Metropolis Hasting algorithm to generate draws from the pos-
terior distribution of the contemporaneous structural matrix, that is p(B0|YT ).
The iteration starts setting α1 = αˆ and for a generic step l + 1 we generate
a candidate α˜(l+1) as a sum of αl and the product between three components:
(1) a vector of independent standard student t variables with 2 degrees of
freedom, (2) a scalar tuning parameter for 30% acceptance ratio and (3) the
Cholesky factorization of the matrix capturing the curvature of the posterior
distribution of the vector of unknowns parameters B0.
Then, we compare the value of the target function evaluated in α˜(l+1) and
α(l), respectively. If q(α˜(l+1)) < q(α(l)), we set α(l+1) = α(l) with probability
1− exp[q(α˜(l+1)− q(α(l+1))]; otherwise we set α(l+1) = α˜(l+1). The value l indi-
cates the number of iterations with the first D burn-in draws included. Thus,
starting with l = D + 1, for each αl we generate δlii ∼ Γ(k∗i , τ ∗i (B0(αl))) for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and take Dl to be diagonal matrix whose elements dlii = 1/δ
l
ii.
Finally, from the posterior distribution of the variance covariance matrix of
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the structural error terms we can further generate b˜li ∼ N (m∗i , dliiM∗i ) for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, where b˜li is the row vector of lagged structural parameters re-
ferred to the ith variable.
In the end, the triple {B0(αl), Dl, Bl}D+Nl=D+1 represents a sample size N of pos-
terior distribution:
p(B0, D,B|YT ) = p(B0|YT )p(D|B0, YT )p(B|A,D, YT )) (1.10)
with the first D burn-in draws equals to 200.000 and N = 200.000.
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1.10 A simplified theoretical model
In this section we provide a stylized version of the theoretical commodity
storage model in the spirit of Eastham (1939).
Figures 1.12 and 1.15 show the main features of the spot and the storage mar-
kets for crude oil. In the spot market the inverse demand function for current
consumption is denoted by DCons and it is defined as P = f(QC) where QC
denotes the amount of crude oil demanded for consumption and P indicates
the spot price of a barrel of crude oil in the current period. The global oil
production is denoted by S.
In the market for storage, the total amount of oil stocks held around the
countries is denoted by N . We postulate that the oil stocks supply curve is
predetermined in the short period while the demand for storage, denoted by
ΨD(N), is a decreasing and convex function of the level of inventories. Thus
the marginal price of storage (or marginal convenience yield) is denoted by ψ.
The equilibrium in the spot market implies that the total demand for crude oil
(DTotal) equals the sum of the quantity supplied (S) and the oil stocks carried
on from the previous period (Nt−1), that is: QT = S + Nt−1. Moreover, the
total amount of crude oil demanded is also defined as the sum of the current
oil stocks held by the market and that quantity used for consumption, that is:
QT = QC +N .
This means that the horizontal difference between DTotal and DCons represents
the quantity demanded for storage at a specific spot price P in any given pe-
riod.
Putting together the two definitions of total demand for crude oil we yield
with the following expression: S − QC = ∆N where ∆N is defined as ∆N =
N − Nt−1 and it represents the current oil inventories flow value. In other
words, the market clearing condition implies a relationship between the cur-
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rent spot price P and the current change in inventories ∆N .
Figure 1.13(a) describes the effect of a negative supply shock in the global
market for crude oil. An oil supply disruption represents a shift to the left of
the simultaneous oil supply curve from S0 to S1 along the total demand for
crude oil. As a result the quantity of crude oil declines from QT0 to Q
T
1 and the
real price increases from P0 to P1.
In the storage market the oil inventories will be draw down in order to smooth
consumption with the consequence of a gradual increase in the marginal con-
venience yield, limiting the rise of the spot price of oil and causing the oil
futures-spot spread to decline. Finally the marginal cost of storage will decline
because of the reduction in oil inventories.
When the effect of the oil supply disruption vanishes, the supply curve and the
real price of oil will go back to the original level and the replenishment of oil
inventories will be reflected by a decline in the convenience yield.
Figure 1.14(a) illustrates the effect of a positive aggregate demand shock on
the spot price of crude oil. This shock causes a shift to the right of the con-
temporaneous oil demand curve mainly driven by the global business cycle.
Thus, current consumption moves from DCons0 to D
Cons
1 along the oil supply
curve and the demand for crude oil increases from DTotal0 to D
Total
1 . In order
to mitigate the adverse effect of the shock on the real price of crude oil, the
level of inventories will decline from N0 to N1. Thus, the increase in the real
price of oil is limited up to P1 and it is instantaneously followed by a drop in
the oil futures-spot spread.
Figure 1.16(a) represents the effect of a positive precautionary demand shock
on the real price of oil in the spot market. This shock can be interpreted as an
increase in the demand for crude oil that is mainly driven by an upward shift
of the demand for oil stocks.
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In the storage market, between t−1 and t, the benefit of holding an extra bar-
rel of crude oil increases from ψA to ψB causing a drop in the oil futures-spot
spread at time t.
In the spot market, the total demand for crude oil increases from DTotal0A to
DTotal1B motivated by a build-up of crude oil inventories.
On impact, the real price of oil overshoots in response to a positive precau-
tionary demand shock moving from PA(t−1) to PB(t).
Beyond the impact period in the storage market crude oil inventories will be
accumulated at lower rate moving from point B to C.
Analogously in the physical market the spot price of crude oil will decline from
PB(t) to PC(T ) defining a new long-run equilibrium denoted by EC .
Finally, figure 1.17(a) shows the effects of a positive financial market shock.
It represents an accumulation of crude oil inventories for reasons not already
captured by the previous three structural shocks.
This shock is triggered by higher prices of the oil futures contracts.
For example, an unexpected positive FM shock might be explained by a spec-
ulative purchase of oil futures contracts, arbitrage mechanisms used to restore
the equilibrium between financial and physical markets, an increase in the
global strategic petroleum reserves and other type of incentive to keep oil off
the spot markets.
Therefore we can consider two possible cases through which the structural
shock in question affects the real price of oil.
First channel consists of an increase in the total demand for crude oil from
DTotal0 to D
Total
1 followed by a simultaneous increase in the spot price of oil
from P0 to P1.
The inventory accumulation causes a decline in the marginal convenience yield,
from ψ0 to ψ1 followed by an increase in the costs of storage. This causes an
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instantaneous rise in the oil futures-spot spread.
The second channel is given by a shift to the right of the total demand for
crude oil followed by an instantaneous shift to the left of the oil supply curve,
from S0 to S1. This shock drives up the spot price of oil from P0 to P2 and
the oil futures-spot spread, on impact. The rise in the oil futures-spot spread
reflects a decline in the marginal convenience yield ψ0 to ψ2.
Finally, a reduction of speculative purchases in the futures market cause a drop
in the expected pay-off of holding inventories. This is followed by a massive
sell-off of oil stocks causing the spot price of oil to decline and the marginal
convenience yield to increase. The latter reflects a drop in the oil futures-spot
spread.
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Figure 1.12: A stylized version of the theoretical commodity model (Eastham
(1939))
Figure 1.13: Negative oil supply shock
Figure 1.14: Positive aggregate demand shock
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Figure 1.15: A stylized version of the theoretical commodity model (Eastham
(1939))
Figure 1.16: Positive precautionary demand shock
Figure 1.17: Positive financial market shock
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This paper provides an analysis of the link between the global market for crude oil
and oil futures risk premium at the aggregate level. It offers empirical evidence on
whether the compensation for risk required by the speculators depends on the type
of the structural shock of interest. Understanding the response of the risk premium
to unexpected changes in the price of oil can be useful to address some research
questions, among which: what is the relationship between crude oil risk premium
and unexpected rise in the price of oil? On average, what should speculators expect
to receive as a compensation for the risk they are taking on? This work is based on a
Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model of the crude oil market. Two main
results emerge. First, the impulse response analysis provides evidence of a negative
relationship between the risk premium and the changes in the price of oil triggered
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2.1 Introduction
The international market for crude oil is exposed to price risk. The lat-
ter can affect the economic performance of a large number of oil companies.
Therefore commercial firms hedge against oil price volatility by taking part of
the oil futures markets.
The risk premium arises because hedger offers to speculator (the counterparty
side to the derivative contract) a monetary reward for non-diversifiable risk in
the crude oil markets.
This paper emphasises the importance of the risk premium for two main rea-
sons. First, it represents the opportunity cost that is accrued to commercial
firms for hedging purposes. Second, it is an attractive investment return for
oil speculators. This is motivated by the inflow of capital into crude oil futures
markets from commodity index traders, also known as index funds. The latter
are economic agents who wish to gain exposure to the oil futures price without
holding the commodity in the physical market.
On a practical level institutional investors sell financial instruments in the over-
the-counter (OTC) markets to commodity index traders. Therefore money
managers who provide suitable instruments that replicate returns of commod-
ity price indices hedge themselves by entering long in the oil futures markets.
The following strategy can have impacts on the crude oil risk premium as dis-
cussed in Hamilton and Wu (2014). The authors show empirical evidence of a
structural change in the average and the volatility of the risk premium in the
crude oil futures contracts as a significant effect of the inflow of money from
index traders.
In this paper we investigate the interaction between unexpected changes in the
economic fundamentals of the global market for crude oil and oil risk premium
at the aggregate level.
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The methodology is based on a Bayesian structural vector autoregressive (BSVAR)
model as discussed in Baumeister and Hamilton (2017). Relative to the exis-
tent literature on oil risk premium this work provides three main contributions.
First, it offers an empirical evidence on whether compensation for risk required
by oil speculators depends on the type of structural shock in question.
We document a negative relationship between the impact responses of the
price of oil and the risk premium to shocks of the economic fundamentals in
the global oil market.
This finding is consistent with theoretical framework based on the hedging
pressure theory, the limits to the arbitrage theory and further considerations
that will be presented and discussed in this analysis.
Moreover understanding the response of oil risk premium to unexpected changes
in the price of oil is useful for some class of investors, such as speculators who
usually take long positions in the oil futures markets.
Therefore this analysis addresses some research questions, among which: What
is the relationship between crude oil risk premium and unexpected rise in the
price of oil? On average, what should speculators expect to receive as a com-
pensation for the risk they are taking on?
Second, this work provides a specific investigation for the risk premium in the
crude oil market as opposed to most of the empirical analysis based on a “port-
folio approach”.
Understanding the economic factors driving the overall rate of return from a
financial commodity portfolio (or index) can be misleading on several aspects.
First of all, the commodity index cannot be a good proxy for the performance
of a single asset class as referred to crude oil.
For example, the Standard and Poor’s-Goldamn Sachs Commodity Index (SP-
GSCI) represents the main benchmark for investment in the commodity mar-
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kets but the share of crude oil futures contracts is only a fraction (about 40%)
of its whole composition. For other indices like the Dow Jones-UBS Commod-
ity Index (DJ-UBSCI) the total energy weight amounts to 30%. Moreover the
weighting scheme of a commodity index might change over time.
Third, the choice of the econometric framework allows us to deal with reverse
causality and consider the endogeneity of the crude oil risk premium with re-
spect to macroeconomic and global oil market variables. This methodology is
widely used in the empirical works for modelling the global price of crude oil,
see Kilian (2009); Kilian and Murphy (2014); Kilian and Lee (2014).
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2.2 presents the literature
review. Section 2.3 describes data and it offers stylised facts on the crude
oil futures market. Section 2.4 discusses the methodology. Empirical results
and some robustness checks are presented in section 2.5 and 2.6, respectively.
Finally, sections 2.7 offers some conclusions.
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2.2 Literature Review
According to the theory of normal backwardation proposed by Keynes
(1930); Hicks (1939) and Kaldor (1939), on average the aggregate short hedg-
ing demand for futures outweighs the long hedging demand. As a result, to
entice speculator to take a long side of the contract the crude oil futures price
should be set below the expected future spot price.
For example the empirical analysis discussed in Bessembinder (1992); Bessem-
binder and Chan (1992) and De Roon and Veld (2000) find out that on aver-
age positive excess returns from holding futures contracts are correlated when
hedgers are net short. Consistent with these findings Hong and Yogo (2012)
show that the hedging pressure is an important determinant of crude oil risk
premium.
In contrast, other studies such as Chang (1985) and Rouwenhorst and Tang
(2012) do not provide robust results in linking the risk premium to position of
speculators and hedgers. Gorton et al. (2013) and Alquist and Gervais (2013)
highlight that changes in the net positions of oil traders do not predict oil
prices movements. Conversely, the authors show that changes in oil prices
help to predict changes in traders’ positions on the oil futures market.
Recently, index speculators have been exposed to commodity indices within a
context of a portfolio diversification as discussed in Cheng and Xiong (2014).
Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) show that commodity futures returns derived
from an equally-weighted index are low correlated with stocks and bonds but
positively correlated with changes in inflation.
Hamilton and Wu (2014) propose a model describing the relationship between
hedging demand from commercial producers, financial investors and the arbi-
trageurs. The equilibrium requires that the expected returns of futures prices
depend on the arbitrageurs’ net exposure to non-diversifiable risk in the crude
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oil market. The authors show that after 2005, the index-fund traders have
considerably reduced the average level of the crude oil risk premium.
Studies by Irwin and Sanders (2012); Brunetti et al. (2013); Sanders and Ir-
win (2014); Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) investigate the role of speculation by
exploiting the relationship between commodity index positions and the path
of prices in energy futures markets.
In these works the authors conduct traditional time-series statistical test with
mixed results to provide evidence of predictive link between commodity in-
dex investment and changes in energy futures prices. The empirical design
behind this literature suffers from some limitations. First, these studies re-
fer to a wide basket of commodities rather than the single market of crude
oil. Second, these works treat position from the commodity index traders as
exogenous to changes in futures prices leading to downward-biased estimates.
Third, Granger-causality test says nothing about the causal relationship be-
tween futures prices and index speculators.
Another view consists of a link between the risk premium and the benefit de-
rived of holding oil stocks. This economic view is typically based on the theory
of storage.
As discussed in Gorton et al. (2013) and Erb and Campbell (2006) the con-
venience yield can be interpreted as a risk premium linked to the level of
inventories which might be able to explain the term structure of the crude oil
futures curve. As a result, higher levels of oil stocks might cause a reduction
in the risk premium because the risk of stock-outs falls.
Alternative methodologies based on volatility models confirm that the rises in
the crude oil risk premium are associated with higher price volatility in the
underlying asset, see Moosa and Al-Loughani (1994) and Considine and Lar-
son (2001).
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Pindyck (2001) highlights that holding a commodity alone entails risk because
the spot price of crude oil might covary positively with the global economy.
Therefore the holders of a commodity will be rewarded for that risk in term of
oil spot prices greater than relative current futures prices.
Finally, the crude oil futures risk premium might be also affected by macroe-
conomic factors. For example, Coimbra and Esteves (2004) find positive cor-
relation between oil futures forecast errors and market expectation errors on
economic activity at the world level. Pagano and Pisani (2009) highlight the
importance of the US business-cycle indicators to provide precise estimates of
oil futures prices adjusted for the risk premium. Analogously, Alquist et al.
(2014) and Heath (2016) show that unspanned macroeconomic factors help to
explain the behaviour of the crude oil risk premium.
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2.3 Data and stylised facts on the crude oil
futures market
The data we use in this work are monthly and cover the period 1983:4-
2016:4. In this analysis two types of variables are employed: the global oil
market variables and the oil risk premium predictors.
The former consists of a set of endogenous variables specific to the global
market for crude oil. In this respect, we use the percentage changes in world
crude oil production, the real economic activity (rea) index 1 proposed by
Kilian (2009) and the real price of oil derived from te US refiners’ imported
acquisition cost of crude oil (RACi). Following Kilian and Murphy (2014),
we use log-price in deviation from sample mean deflated by the US consumer
price index. According to the current literature on interpreting the oil price
shocks as terms of trade shocks, the RACi is likely to be a better proxy for
the global price of crude oil. This postulates that, rises in the RACi triggered
by exogenous events in oil markets cause a decline in the aggregate domestic
income. Moreover, Valenti (2018) shows that the empirical results provided
by RACi response estimates are qualitatively more precise than those derived
from alternative measures of international oil prices, like the Brent spot price
1The real economic activity index rea is available from http://www-personal.umich.
edu/~lkilian/paperlinks.html. This index requires raw data for individual dry bulk
cargo freight rates. Following Kilian (2009), the construction of rea is based on three steps.
First, one has to compute the period-to-period growth rates of each available series. Second,
one has to compute the cumulative equal-weighted average of the growth rates, having
normalized January of 1968 to unity. Third, the index has to be deflated by the US CPI
index. Despite, our analysis starts in 1983 (because WTI oil spot prices are available from
that period) we use the original version of the rea index. This approach does not undermine
the accuracy of our empirical results. We point out that, in 1980, four series are involved
for the construction of the index and they remain the same until 1983, the period in which
we start our analysis. Therefore, there is not much difference from the cross average of
the raw data for individual freight rates and their cumulative average growth rate if the
index is constructed starting in 1960 or in 1983. The only difference is the change in the
normalization applied to the starting value of the index but this does not compromise the
economic meaning of the indicator for the future periods.
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of oil.
The macroeconomic measure we use in this analysis is derived from the bulk
dry cargo ocean shipping freight rates and it is a proxy for the volume of
international shipping in the commodity markets.
The rea index offers some important advantages for the identification of oil
price shocks since it represents a monthly, direct, and leading measure of global
business cycle, as pointed out by Kilian and Zhou (2017).
A widely accepted issue of the rea index refers to its potential exposure to
idiosyncratic shocks. The latter might undermine the accuracy of this indicator
as a measure of global business cycle. Therefore in section 2.6 we highlight the
main results by replacing the rea index with a global measure of real output,
that is the monthly industrial production index as discussed in Baumeister and
Hamilton (2017).2
Finally, this work focuses on the crude oil risk premium which represents the
predictable pay-off of an oil futures contract held to maturity. As opposed to
the previous variables crude oil risk premium is not observable and it must be
estimated from the data.
Therefore to derive the monthly realized excess return we use three months
futures contracts price as the end-of-month value and close daily spot price
traded on WTI market. 3
As regards the set of risk premium predictors we include both macroeconomic
and financial data. Table 2.1 reports a summary of the explanatory variables
used for the estimation of the risk premium.
We use changes of the US consumer price index to derive a monthly measure for
2The monthly industrial production index is available from https://sites.google.com/
site/cjsbaumeister/research and it includes data for OECD and non-OECD countries.
The latter refer to economies like China, India, Brazil, Russia, South-Africa and Indonesia.
3We select futures price from WTI market since it represents the simplest way to obtain
the longest available series to compute realized log-returns of a crude oil futures investment.
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annual inflation rate (inf). Some empirical studies find out that the expected
(ei) and unexpected (ui) component of the inflation rate is positively correlated
with prospective returns of a commodity futures investment. This is consistent
with the view that investors use crude oil futures contracts to hedge against
inflation risks.
Following Casassus and Collin Dufresne (2006) we consider a proxy for the
Table 2.1: List of predictors for the estimation of the risk premium
Id Predictors Descriptions
1 inf Annual CPI inflation rate
2 ei Expected US inflation
3 ui Unexpected US inflation
4 cts Change in the term structure yield curve
5 cdp Change in the default premium
6 jbp Junk bond premium
7 cli Composite leading indicator
8 cip Annual changes of U.S industrial production index
slope of the yield curve in order to capture the relationship between the US
government bond and crude oil market. We refer to the change in the term
structure yield curve (cts) which is defined as the difference between the 10-
Year Treasury constant maturity rate and the Treasury Bill of maturity 3-
months.
Variation in liquidity plays an important role in explaining the factor structure
of the global business cycle and it can be correlated with the risk premium.
Therefore the analysis takes into account other two indicators. The first is the
change in default premium (cdp) defined as the difference between Moody’s
Baa corporate bond yield and 10-year treasury constant maturity rate. The
second indicator is called junk bond spread (jbs) and is derived as differences
between Baa and Aaa corporate bond yields rated by Moody.
Moreover empirical results by Pagano and Pisani (2009) suggest that the risk
premium in the commodity markets can be strongly affected by fluctuations in
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the business cycle of the global economy. Therefore this analysis includes the
composite leading indicator (cli) and the yearly changes in the US industrial
production index (cip).
2.3.1 The estimation of the crude oil risk premium
The oil risk premium represents the average returns that long investors
expect to receive as a reward for non-diversifiable risk in the crude oil futures
market. The risk premium is not observable but it can be estimated from the
data. In this analysis we follow two different methodologies.
The first approach relies on a multivariate linear regression model. The second
method is based on a Gaussian affine term-structure model in which time-
varying crude oil risk premium depends on three latent factors. The first two
factors are identified as the level and the slope of the term structure futures
curve while the last can be though as a proxy for measurement error.
Regarding the first methodology we define the log realized excess returns of a
crude oil futures investment as ert+3 = ln
(
St+3
Ft,3
)
.
Specifically, Ft,3 denotes the price of futures contract at the end of the day of
month t (with maturity 3-months) and St+3 is the corresponding realized daily
spot price at the next 3-months from period t.
In this analysis we provide four alternative measures of crude oil risk premium
in order to assess the robustness of the empirical results. We estimate the
first-three measures of risk premium as follow:
rp
(1)
t+3 ≡ eˆrt+3 = αˆ + βˆ1inft + βˆ6jbpt + βˆ7clit for t = 1, 2, . . . , T (2.1)
rp
(2)
t+3 ≡ eˆrt+3 = αˆ + βˆ3uit + βˆ4ctst + βˆ7clit for t = 1, 2, . . . , T (2.2)
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rp
(3)
t+3 ≡ eˆrt+3 = αˆ + βˆ2eit + βˆ5cdpt + βˆ8cipt for t = 1, 2, . . . , T (2.3)
where T = 400 , αˆ and βˆ are consistently estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS), as pointed out by Baumeister and Kilian (2016). Although the risk pre-
mium regression analysis is widely accepted in the academic literature some
concerns might arise about the selection criteria of the exogenous variables.
Therefore we provide an alternative estimate of risk premium based on oil fu-
tures prices, only. This approach stems from an affine factor structure model
as developed by Hamilton and Wu (2014).
The authors propose a model of the time-varying risk premium that imposes
an affine factor structure which is common for oil futures prices and the eco-
nomic fundamentals of the global market for crude oil.
The risk premium is identified by the difference between the observed futures
prices and the rational expectation of future spot price. The latter depends
on the risk price parameter which is thought as an affine function of the latent
variables.
To estimate an affine term structure model we postulate the existence of three
factors. The first-two factors represent level and slope of the nearest three
futures contracts while the third factor is usually interpreted as measurement
error.
Data are collected such that the maturity of futures contracts changes with
each observation. Thus, implementation of the term structure model only re-
quires oil futures prices collected in an unbalanced dataset in which the panel
structure is given by different maturities and the monthly time-series dimen-
sion is made by the futures price on the last day of each week.
Following Hamilton and Wu (2012) the set of parameters included in the affine
term structure model can be derived by applying the method of minimum-
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chi-square estimation (MCSE) to the unrestricted reduced form estimates. In
this way it is possible to infer the crude oil risk premium as difference between
the oil futures price based on the structural parameters under risk-neutrality
assumptions and the observed oil futures price that characterize the real world
dynamic. 4
Figure 2.1 plots four alternative estimates of the risk premium based on the
Figure 2.1: Risk premium regression estimates.
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Note: Figure 2.1 plots the risk premium estimates across different specifications
and methodologies over the period January 1990 - April 2016.
methodologies and the specifications that have been previously discussed. Two
basic features emerge. First, significant similarities can be seen between the
pairs of risk premium estimates. In particular, the first and the second mea-
sures of risk premium show highly positive correlation (0.93) over the entire
sample. This becomes stronger (0.96) from January 2000 to April 2016. More-
over the risk premium estimate implied by the affine term structure model,
4Hamilton and Wu (2012) show that the MCSE minimizes a quadratic form in the dif-
ference between the reduced-form parameters implied by the structural model and the ols
estimates derived from the reduced-form model. The quadratic form corresponds to the in-
formation matrix and the MCSE is asymptotically equivalent to full-information maximum
likelihood estimator.
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rp
(4)
t+3, is positively correlated with rp
(3)
t+3. In particular their correlation ranges
from 0.32 (January 1984 - April 2016) to 0.46 (January 2000 - April 2016).
Second, the last two measures of crude oil risk premium document a systematic
downward shift of their average level.
Following Baumeister and Kilian (2016), we compute the mean squared predic-
tion error (MSPE) ratio between the rational expectation of future spot price
and the random-walk process in order to assess the accuracy of each risk pre-
mium estimate. Rational expectations of future spot price equals the futures
prices adjusted for the crude oil risk premium. A case of MSPE ratio below
one indicates an improvement in the accuracy of the random-walk process.
Table 2.2 reports the predictive accuracy of risk-adjusted futures price and the
p-value associated with the MSPE reduction based on the test of Clark and
West (2007).
Table 2.2: Predictive accuracy of risk-adjusted futures price.
Risk premium Mean squared prediction ratio p-value
rp1t+3 0.92 0.03
rp2t+3 0.95 0.03
rp3t+3 0.88 0.05
rp4t+3 0.82 0.02
2.3.2 Stylised facts on the crude oil futures market
Broadly speaking, participants in the oil futures market can be classified
into three categories: hedgers, speculators and arbitrageurs.
The hedgers have economic interests in the physical market and they hedge
against price risks by holding opposite positions in the spot and futures mar-
kets at the same time.
For example, an oil producer can lock in the price of crude oil production by
selling a certain amount of futures contracts in anticipation of a later spot mar-
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ket sale. In contrast, an oil consumer can hedge against rising crude oil prices
by buying a given number of futures contracts in anticipation of an actual
physical market purchase. Although hedging activities represent the simplest
way to manage price risks they could also affect the total revenues accruing to
both consumers and producers.
The oil speculators are not interested in making (or taking) delivery of the com-
modity in the physical market but they buy (or sell) paper barrels to make
profits as an opportunity for a capital gain in anticipation of price changes or
as component of a diversified portfolio.
For example, the Commodity Pool Operators (CPO’s) are investment vehicles
that collect capital from a large number of investors, through a public or pri-
vate offering, in order to facilitate investment opportunities in a portfolio of
commodity futures.
The CPO’s usually delegate the Commodity Trading Advisors (CTA’s) who
are professional money managers able to engage futures transactions in the
derivative markets. Analogously the hedge funds invest on behalf of rich peo-
ple in conjunction with other investment products like stocks, currencies and
bonds.
As a result the participation of financial institutions such as banks, hedge, mu-
tual and pension funds, money managers can add liquidity to crude oil futures
market serving as a counterparty for the hedgers.
The arbitrageurs are the third class of actors who attempt to profit from any
markets’ price discrepancies.
All categories above mentioned are easier to separate in principle than in prac-
tice but their definitions reported in this analysis are consistent with those
proposed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
The following regulatory agency breaks down the number of outstanding short
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and long futures contracts for crude oil on the basis of two macro categories:
the “commercial” and “non-commercial” firms.
The former include physical participants such as producers, merchants, pro-
cessors and end-users that have a direct interest in physical oil production,
consumption and trade.
The latter are mainly made by financial participants like money managers and
hedge funds that are interested in trading futures contracts for investment pur-
poses.
In this context commercial firms are considered hedgers while non-commercial
firms are treated as speculative traders.
At first sight it might be questionable to assume that commercial firms are
only hedgers. For example a producer (or consumer) can hedge only a fraction
of its physical underlying taking implicitly a speculative position, see Fattouh
et al. (2013).
However, since in this analysis the risk premium is defined as a monetary re-
ward accrued to speculators for their non-diversifiable risk in the commodity
market, it is reasonable to refer to a non-commercial firm as a speculative
trader.
The hedging pressure theory states that the risk premium arises from the in-
teraction between hedgers and speculators and it becomes higher (in absolute
value) when the hedging demand increases.
The open interest represents the number of derivative contracts held by both
commercial and non-commercial firms at the end of a trading day. This is a
proxy for the flow of money injected into the futures market and it can be used
to define an aggregate measure of hedging (or speculative) pressure.
Therefore we define the net-hedging demand as a ratio between the net and
gross positions of the futures contracts referred to commercial firms. Analo-
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gously, the same logic applied to non-commercial firms yields to a measure of
net-speculative demand. This last can be also interpreted as proxy for net-
hedging supply.
Interestingly, the CFTC considers financial institutions called swap dealers
Figure 2.2: Hedging pressure indicators.
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
-0.5
0
0.5
1
H
ed
gi
ng
 p
re
ss
ur
e
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
W
TI
 S
po
t p
ric
e
Net speculative demand
Net hedging demand
WTI spot price
Note: Figure 2.2 plots the WTI spot prices combined with the hedging pressure
indicators over the period January 2006 - April 2016. Green histograms refer to
the net-hedging demand from commercial firms. Negative values indicate that
hedgers are net-short. Green histograms refer to the net-speculative demand
from money managers. Positive values indicate that speculators are net-long.
as commercial firms. Although these entities represent investment banks and
commodity brokers/dealers, they act as intermediaries for producers and con-
sumers suggesting that their positions on futures market should reflect hedging
purposes. However, it may not always be obvious to understand whether swap
dealers operate for commercial firms or not. For this reason we do not include
the positions of swap dealers on the derivative market in the definition of hedg-
ing pressure measure.
Figure 2.2 plots the monthly WTI spot price combined with the net positions
held by both the hedgers and the speculators.
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It is important to note that an investor might hold both long and short posi-
tions in the futures market. In particular for every contract that one trader
is long there is another trader who is short such that the outstanding value of
long and short futures contract is exactly offsetting.
Figure 2.2 shows that on average the hedgers are net-short and speculators
are net-long. Interestingly, hedgers seem to follow price trend: they increase
their net-short positions when the spot price falls and move from short to long
positions when spot price rises. On the other hand, speculators seem to change
their positions in the futures market with the object to replicate the spot price
of oil, providing market liquidity.
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2.4 Econometric method
The methodology is based on a Bayesian structural vector autoregressive
(BSVAR) model inspired by Baumeister and Hamilton (2017). In this section
we provide an economic explanation for each of the structural equations and
the corresponding informative prior distributions. Further details of the iden-
tification strategy and the Bayesian algorithm as proposed by Baumeister and
Hamilton (2015) are reported in 2.8.
The SVAR model is the following:
Ayt = c+
24∑
j=1
Bjyt−j + vt (2.4)
where A is the matrix of instantaneous structural parameters and c is the vector
of constant terms. The vector of endogenous variables is yt and it includes the
percent change in global crude oil production (qt), the global real economic
activity (reat), the real price of crude oil (pt) and the crude oil risk premium
(rpt). The structural representation considered in 2.4 is based on a system of
four equations:
qt = aq,ppt + b˜1xt−1 + v1t (2.5)
reat = area,qqt + area,ppt + b˜2xt−1 + v2t (2.6)
pt = ap,qqt + ap,reareat + b˜3xt−1 + v3t (2.7)
rpt = arp,qqt + arp,reareat + arp,ppt + b˜4xt−1 + v4t (2.8)
where b˜1, b˜2, b˜3 and b˜4 are row vectors of structural lagged coefficients
5 related
to the first-four equations and xt−1 is a column vector including a constant
5The generic b˜i contains all structural lagged coefficients of the i
th equation belongs to
the first row of Bj , for j = 1, · · · , 24. In other words, b˜i has a dimension (n×m+ 1) where
n and m are the numbers of endogenous variables and lags, respectively.
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and the past variables.
The oil supply equation is given by 2.5. It is a function of only one contempora-
neous structural parameter aq,p which represents the short-run price elasticity
of oil supply.
The real economic activity modelled in equation 2.6 is instantaneously affected
by the global oil production and the real price of crude oil due to area,q and
area,p, respectively.
The inverse demand function of the global market for crude oil is defined in
equation 2.7. The structural coefficient ap,q is the reciprocal of short-run price
elasticity of oil demand. The parameter ap,rea represents the effect of changes
in the real economic activity index on the global price of crude oil.
The risk premium estimate modelled in equation 2.8 is contemporaneously af-
fected by all endogenous variables that are considered in this analysis.
Finally vt = (v1t, v2t, v3t, v4t)
′ denotes a vector of structural innovations with
the following variance covariance structure: Et(vtv
′
t) = D and Et(vtv
′
s) = 0 if
t 6= s. The fact that D is a diagonal matrix implies that the structural shocks
can be economically interpreted in terms of shifts in demand and supply.
In particular, the first shock (v1t), oil supply shock, is the unexpected changes
in the global oil production. The second shock (v2t), aggregate demand shock,
reflects a rise in the demand for crude oil and other industrial commodities
driven by fluctuations in the global business cycle. The third shock (v3t), pre-
cautionary demand shock, is related to a unanticipated change in the demand
for crude oil for future consumption.
Finally, the fourth shock (v4t) is called risk premium shock and it is designed
to capture unexpected changes in the risk premium which are not driven by
the first-three structural shocks. For example, it might reflect an increase in
the price of risk and/or capital constraints, difficulty to achieve a diversified
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investment portfolio, and the existence of profitable opportunities from other
markets.
The matrix summarizing the simultaneous structural relations among the en-
dogenous variables can be denoted as follow:
A =

1 0 −aq,p 0
−area,q 1 −area,p 0
−ap,q −ap,rea 1 0
−arp,q −arp,rea −arp,p 1

(2.9)
The first row of matrix A characterizes the oil supply equation, as reported in
2.5. For the short-run price supply elasticity aq,p, we assign student t(cq,p, σq,p, νq,p)
positive truncated distribution, with mode at cq,p = 0.1, scale parameter
σq,p = 0.2 and degrees of freedom νq,p = 3.
A small value of oil supply elasticity reflects the large costs of production for
the oil industry, see for example Pindyck (1994, 2001). Moreover, our choice
of prior mode for aq,p is consistent with the empirical studies of Baumeister
and Hamilton (2017) and Caldara et al. (2017).
The second row of A includes the structural parameters of the real economic
activity equation. In this respect, we are confident to put a prior student t
density function for area,p with mode at crea,q = 0, scale parameter σrea,q = 0.1
and νrea,q = 3 degrees of freedom. Since the real economic activity index is
derived from a bulk dry cargo ocean shipping fright rates, by construction,
changes in amount crude oil production (liquid commodity) do not directly
affect the proxy for global real economic activity.
As regards the effect of changes in the real price of crude on the real economic
activity index (area,p), we put a relative uninformative student t prior distri-
bution, with at mode crea,p = 0, scale parameter σrea,p = 0.5 and νrea,p = 3
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degrees of freedom, negative truncated. A negative truncation density is con-
sitent with the view that an increase in the real price of oil causes a reduction
in the economic activity index, as pointed out by Kilian (2009); Kilian and
Murphy (2014).
In matrix 2.9 the structural coefficient ap,q represents the reciprocal of short
run price elasticity of oil demand. We put a student t(cp,q, σp,q, νp,q) prior dis-
tribution with mode at cp,q = −3, scale parameter σ31 = 0.1 , ν31 = 3 degrees
of freedom and truncated to be negative. Our prior mode for ap,q implies a
short-run price demand elasticity centred around -0.33. This last value is co-
herent with the empirical literature on estimating the price elasticity of crude
oil demand in the short run, see for example West and Williams (2004, 2007)
and Tiezzi and Verde (2014). The structural coefficient ap,rea represents the
effect of changes in economic activity on the real price of crude oil. Despite
the rea is not a direct measure of real output we exploit some specific results
provided by Kilian and Murphy (2012) and Valenti (2018). According to the
first study, the effect of economic activity on the real price of crude oil from
the impact multiplier matrix is positive and around 2. The second analysis
finds that the posterior median for the structural coefficient ap,rea has mass
of probability centred around 1.4, given a completely agnostic prior student
t density function. As a result, we assign student t(cp,rea, σp,rea, νp,rea) prior
distribution with mode at cp,rea = 1.4, scale parameter σp,rea = 0.2 , ν32 = 3
degrees of freedom and truncated to be positive.
Finally for the parameters of the risk premium equation we assign completely
uninformative prior t student distributions, with location parameter ci = 0,
scale σi = 100 and degrees of freedom ν = 3.
The structural matrix 2.9 involves four zero-restrictions hypothesis. Specifi-
cally, two exclusion restrictions on the elements of the global oil supply equa-
123
2. Interpreting the oil risk premium: do oil price shocks matter?
tion, that is aq,rea = aq,rp = 0. The latter are consistent with the assumption
that global oil production does not respond to any change in the economic ac-
tivity and crude oil risk premium, within the same period. This implies that,
changes in the global crude oil production are only caused by changes in real
price of oil. Finally, given the forward-looking nature of the risk premium we
impose the remaining two exclusion restrictions on the structural parameters
area,rp and ap,rp.
The prior density of matrix A is given by the product of all student t den-
sities of each structural parameter subject to the sign restrictions previously
discussed.
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2.5 Empirical results
Impulse response analysis. In this section we proceed to the analysis of
the dynamic responses of the endogenous variables to each structural shock.
The shocks have been normalized such that they imply an increase in the real
price of oil.
The empirical results reported in this section use the estimate of crude oil risk
premium derived from the affine term structure model proposed by Hamilton
and Wu (2014).
Figure 2.3 depicts the median impulse responses of oil production, real eco-
nomic activity and price of oil to oil supply and oil demand shocks together
with the corresponding pointwise 68% percentiles of the posterior distribution.
The impulse response estimates imply that an unexpected oil supply disrup-
tion causes a contemporaneous drop in the global crude oil production. This
shock is also associated with an increase in the price of oil and a decline in the
real economic activity, on impact.
An unanticipated positive aggregate demand shock causes an instantaneous
increase in the real economic activity, in the global oil production and in the
real price of crude oil.
Finally a positive precautionary demand shock causes a contemporaneous in-
crease in the global oil production accompanied by an hump-shaped response
of the real price of oil. The impact response of the real economic activity to a
positive precautionary demand shock is negative.
Figure 2.3 provides empirical evidence that the dynamic responses of global
oil market variables to each structural shock are consistent with the empirical
results of Kilian (2009); Kilian and Murphy (2014); Kilian and Lee (2014) and
Baumeister and Hamilton (2017).
Figure 2.4 plots the median impulse response function of the oil futures risk
125
2. Interpreting the oil risk premium: do oil price shocks matter?
F
igu
re
2.3:
M
ed
ian
im
p
u
lse
resp
on
ses
of
glob
al
oil
p
ro
d
u
ction
,
real
econ
om
ic
activ
ity
an
d
p
rice
of
oil
to
oil
m
arket
sh
o
ck
s
0
5
10
15
20
−1
−0.5 0
0.5 1
O
il supply shock
Oil production
0
5
10
15
20
−5 0 5 10
O
il supply shock
Real economic activity
0
5
10
15
20
0 5 10
O
il supply shock
Real price of oil
0
5
10
15
20
−1
−0.5 0
0.5 1
Aggregate dem
and shock
Oil production
0
5
10
15
20
−5 0 5 10
Aggregate dem
and shock
Real economic activity
0
5
10
15
20
0 5 10
Aggregate dem
and shock
Real price of oil
0
5
10
15
20
−1
−0.5 0
0.5 1
Precautionary dem
and shock
Oil production
0
5
10
15
20
−5 0 5 10
Precautionary dem
and shock
Real economic activity
0
5
10
15
20
0 5 10
Precautionary dem
and shock
Real price of oil
N
ote:
F
igu
re
2.3
p
lots
th
e
B
ayesian
p
osterior
m
ed
ian
resp
on
ses
to
on
e-stan
d
ard
d
ev
iation
stru
ctu
ral
sh
o
ck
s.
B
lack
lin
es
in
d
icate
th
e
im
p
u
lse
resp
on
se
estim
ates
b
ased
on
stru
ctu
ral
m
o
d
els
satisfy
in
g
th
e
id
en
tifi
cation
stru
ctu
re.
D
ash
ed
lin
es
in
d
icate
th
e
68%
cred
ib
le
region
.
126
2.5. Empirical results
premium to each structural shock. There is empirical evidence that the crude
oil risk premium responds to oil price shocks differently, depending on the
cause behind the shock. Specifically, a positive risk premium shock causes an
immediate jump in the oil futures risk premium, but only temporarily. In con-
trast, an oil supply disruption and a positive aggregate demand shock causes
a negligible instantaneous decline in the crude oil risk premium. Notice that,
beyond the impact period, the economic activity shock causes a more persis-
tent reduction in the risk premium than a negative supply shock.
Finally, the impact response of the oil risk premium to a positive precautionary
demand shock is negative. Overall, this shock causes a persistent decline in
the oil risk premium, that can be motivated as follows.
First, the expected speculative gains (hence, the crude oil risk premium) de-
crease as current oil prices increase. This is consistent with the fact that higher
oil prices require that speculators allocate more capital to purchase the same
amount of contracts, causing the marginal value of the investment to decrease.
Second, when the term structure of the oil future curve is in contango, it is
highly likely that a large number of speculators increases their long position
in these contracts because they expect that the price of oil will be higher in
the future. As a result, the rise in the speculative purchase of futures contract
and hence, the competition among oil speculators, might cause a decline in the
average prospective investment’s return in the crude oil futures market.
Moreover, it is important to note that the decline in the risk premium might
be reinforced by a reduction in the short-hedging demand of commercial firms.
Although every hedging strategy implies an off-setting gain between spot and
financial markets, it is well known that higher levels of oil prices might lead
to a reduction of the incentive to hedge against price drops. This is motivated
by a higher return than hedgers would receive if they did not hedge.
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Figure 2.4: Median impulse responses of oil risk premium to each structural
shock
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This conjecture is consistent with the view that crude oil risk premium is
higher when net-short hedging demand is higher as discussed by Acharya and
Ramadorai (2013). This implies that during a high level of oil prices an in-
crease in the hedging supply from speculators and/or a reduction in the hedging
demand from commercial firms might cause a reduction in the crude oil risk
premium.
Third, the growing interests in commodity futures contract as an asset class
for portfolio investment have attracted attention of many arbitrageurs causing
the arbitrage profits to increase and the risk premium earned by oil speculators
to decline, as discussed by Duffie (2010) and Etula (2013).
The average excess return of a crude oil futures investment consists of a spot
return and a roll return. The spot return is simply the appreciation (or depre-
ciation) of the futures contract held to maturity. The roll-return (or roll-yield)
arises when investors want to maintain a crude oil futures position. This can
be easily done, by selling the expiring contract and use the proceed to buy
another futures contract for delivery at a more distant date.
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In the case of backwardated market oil speculators can earn a positive roll-yield
even if the spot price does not change. The roll-yield (and hence the crude
oil risk premium received by oil speculators) could partially decline because of
the arbitrageurs’ attempt to profit from any possible mispricing triggered by
index funds or other types of speculators during the rolling period.
Therefore, roll yield opportunities for commodity investors might cause a provi-
sional reduction in the expiring futures price below its equilibrium. Conversely,
the buying pressure of the next-to-expire contracts might cause a rise above
the their economic fundamental prices.
As a result, the arbitrageurs attempt to profit from market price discrepancy
through a long-short strategy. In other words, they can simultaneously short
the nearby maturity contract and long the more distant one by earning a profit
from the calendar spread. The arbitrageurs will close-out their positions by
longing the short-maturity contract and shorting the long-maturity contract.
Basically, the arbitrageurs’ gain causes a drop in the crude oil risk premium
which is mainly reflected by the decline in the roll-yield.
The empirical results shown in figure 2.4 represent valuable source of informa-
tion for all investors who are interested in a long-only exposure to the price of
oil. The global market for crude oil plays a primary role in determining the
performance of commodity index traders or financial portfolios. Thus, under-
standing the path response of crude oil risk premium to unexpected changes in
the price of oil can help how best to perform forward looking asset allocation
analysis. In order to define a proper set of forward-looking efficient frontiers,
oil speculators should combine assets weight and forecasts return at the net of
the risk premium reduction, as documented in this analysis.
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Historical decomposition. Figure 2.5 plots the historical decomposition of
the crude oil risk premium and the real price of oil along with 68% posterior
credible set.
There is empirical evidence that, from early 2003 until mid-2008, shocks to
aggregate demand (likely driven by Emerging Asia and OECD countries) have
represented the main economic factors behind the decline in the oil futures
risk premium. This suggests that economic fundamentals represent the ratio-
nal drivers behind any investment strategy taken on by speculators.
We would like to highlight that this finding remains consistent with the claim
that the growth of commodity index investments have caused a reduction in
the crude oil risk premium during the financialization of commodity markets.
Interestingly, the historical effect of the risk premium shocks on the real price
of oil is negligible. This result suggests that specific shocks to speculators (in-
dependent from the aggregate demand and/or supply of oil) were not the main
factors in explaining the path of crude oil risk premium, during the financial-
ization of commodity markets. This is consistent with the empirical results of
Kilian and Lee (2014).
The role of speculation in driving the oil prices became important for policy
implications when the spot price of oil dropped from historic highs of $130 in
July 2008 to $33, five months later.
In the first half of 2008, figure 2.5 offers indication that the decline in crude
oil risk premium was associated with an increase in the real price of oil mainly
driven by shocks to precautionary demand for oil. The latter were likely trig-
gered by some exogenous events in oil markets, as discussed by Smith (2009).
For example, in March 2008 there was the sabotages of two main oil export
pipelines in the south of Iraq, in April 2008 the strike of Nigerian union workers
and finally, in June 2008 there was the closure of North Forties pipeline in UK
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and the mass rioting in Nigeria.
Figure 2.6 plots the hedging pressure indicator six months before crude oil
reached a peak of $130 per barrel in July 2008, an all-time high.
The significant increase in the price of oil caused a reduction in the net-hedging
demand from commercial firms followed by a decline in the crude oil risk pre-
mium paid to the speculators as a form insurance against down-trended prices.
On the other side, higher oil prices required more money to invest in the fu-
tures market to buy the same amount of contracts. This caused a reduction
in the crude oil risk premium.
Moreover figure 2.5 shows that positive precautionary demand shocks were
partially responsible for the reduction of crude oil risk premium between 2010
and 2012. These shocks might be triggered by some concerns about interna-
tional oil supply disruptions.
For example, Bastianin et al. (2017) discuss that Libyan civil war of February
2011 took about 1.5 million barrels per day off the global markets.
Moreover, the political tensions related to Iran’s nuclear program lead to the
European Union foreign ministers to agree on a ban on the transport, purchase
and import into Europe of Iranian crude oil.
In early 2012 the Europe’s sovereign debt crisis represented another possible
factor that contributed to decline the crude oil risk premium through precau-
tionary demand shocks.
On the other hand, a sequence of positive and negative aggregate demand
shocks was responsible for high level of risk premium until the end of 2013. As
a result the effect of precautionary and aggregate demand shocks on oil risk
premium was offsetting.
Between June and December 2014, the drop in the price of crude oil caused a
systematic upward trend of the oil risk premium, which was mainly caused by a
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combination of unanticipated positive shocks to the global oil production and
negative aggregate demand shocks. The latter could reflect the unexpected
slowdown in the global economy, likely driven by the decline in the Chinese
manufacturing industry as reflected by the reduction in the level of Caixin
manufacturing index.
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2.6 Robustness checks
2.6.1 Alternative crude oil risk premium estimates.
The first robustness check relies on different estimates of crude oil risk
premium, denoted by rp
(1)
t+3, rp
(2)
t+3 and rp
(3)
t+3. The latter are derived from
the multivariate linear regression model, as reported in 2.3.1. In section 2.5
we have shown that the crude oil risk premium responds to oil price shocks
differently, depending on the cause behind the shocks. This is also confirmed
by figure 2.7. The latter plots the impulse response functions for each risk
premium estimate.
An oil supply disruption (first column) causes a slight decline in the risk
premium but much of the initial drop is reversed within the first ten months.
Notice that, the impulse response functions of the first-three risk premium
estimates to unexpected changes in global oil production, are somewhat larger
than impulse response functions derived from futures prices only. A positive
aggregate demand shock (second column), driven by unexpected fluctuation in
the global business cycle, causes a large reduction in the crude oil risk premium.
In general, during periods of strong economic growth we would expect to see
a rise in the level of inflation. Although numerous studies document that
commodity diversified portfolios represent one of the best ways to hedge against
inflation risks our results suggest that the efficacy of this strategy could be
adversely affected by the reduction in crude oil risk premium.
Finally, a positive precautionary demand shock causes a persistent reduction
in all risk premium estimates. According to Kilian (2009) and Alquist and
Kilian (2010) this shock might reflect an unanticipated increase in the demand
for storage. The latter might provide useful information about what the term
structure of futures prices will look like in the future.
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Our results suggest that whenever the shape of the term structure is downward-
sloping because of a positive precautionary demand shock the crude oil risk
premium earned by a long investor could decline, even during backwardated
futures market.
In sum, figure 2.7 provides evidence that impact responses of crude oil risk
premium estimate to demand shocks are greater than supply shocks. Moreover,
precautionary and aggregate demand shocks cause qualitatively similar results
on the first-three risk measures of risk premium. Finally, figure 2.8 plots the
median impulse response of the endogenous variables to different proxies for a
positive risk premium shock.
The first piece of evidence is that the oil risk premium is the only variable to
increase in response to unanticipated positive risk premium shocks.
Other macroeconomic and global oil market variables are not simultaneously
affected by the risk premium shock, according to the identification structure
implied by the model.
For this reason, risk premium shocks are not driven by economic fundamentals,
as is typical of the global market for crude oil. For commercial firms positive
shocks to the risk premium reflect a rise in the cost of hedging for reasons that
are independent from the global market for crude oil.
Finally, figure 2.8 shows that an unanticipated positive risk premium shock
might cause a rise in the cost of hedging for commercial firms. This would
cause an increase in the price of oil beyond the impact period. It is important
to point out that this result does not hold for every risk premium estimate.
Therefore, we conclude that upon the impact period the effects of positive risk
premium shocks on the real price of oil is mixed.
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2.6.2 Alternative proxy for global real economic activity
The second robustness check relies on a different proxy for global real eco-
nomic activity in order to assess the accuracy of our empirical findings. To
this end, we estimate model 2.4 by replacing the Kilian’s index (rea) with the
growth rate of OECD+6 world industrial production index (wip). The latter
allows us to exploit some prior beliefs on the income elasticity of oil demand
given the methodology applied to recover the structural shocks.
In this respect, the contemporaneous structural matrix 2.9 can be re-written
as:
A =

1 0 −aq,p 0
−awip,q 1 −awip,p 0
−ap,q −ap,wip 1 0
−arp,q −arp,wip −arp,p 1

(2.10)
We postulate that there is no direct feedback from changes in global oil pro-
duction to changes in the industrial production, analogous to the benchmark
model, discussed in section 2.4. Therefore, we put a student t prior distribu-
tion on awip,q with mode at cwip,q = 0, scale parameter σwip,q = 0.2 and degrees
of freedom νwip,q = 3.
Following Baumeister and Hamilton (2017), for the structural coefficient awip,p
we put a student t prior distribution with mode at cwip,p = −0.05, scale param-
eter σwip,p = 0.2 and degrees of freedom νwip,p = 3, truncated to be negative.
The sign restriction on awip,p reflects the economic beliefs that an increase in
the price of crude oil causes a reduction in the industrial production. Finally,
the structural parameter ap,wip governs the effect of changes in industrial pro-
duction on the global price of crude oil. For an income elasticity of oil demand
close to 0.7, the prior distribution function for ap,wip is a student t density with
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mode at cp,wip = 2.1
6 , scale parameter σp,wip = 0.2 and degrees of freedom
νp,wip = 3, truncated to be positive. However, even the industrial production
Figure 2.9: Impulse response function of risk premium
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Figure 2.10: Impulse response function of real price of oil
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Note: Impulse response function of risk premium and real price of oil. Solid
black and red lines refer to the impulse response function of risk premium to
each structural shock implied by 2.9 and 2.10, respectively. Dashed black and
red lines refer to the impulse response function of real price of oil for both 2.9
and 2.10 structural contemporaneous matrices.
index is not without shortcomings.
As pointed out by Kilian and Zhou (2017), the major OECD emerging
6Given the definition of income elasticity of oil demand, qoil,I =
∆Qoil%
∆I% =
∆Qoil%
∆Poil%
×
∆Poil%
∆I% = aq,p × ap,wip = ap,wipap,q = aq,wip. Given a density function for the reciprocal price
elasticity of oil demand (ap,q) with mode at cpq = 3 in absolute value, we need to put
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2. Interpreting the oil risk premium: do oil price shocks matter?
economies like China and India are not included in the index between 2003
and 2006.
Moreover, depending on the transformation applied to the industrial produc-
tion index, the indicator does not provide a unique picture of the global busi-
ness cycle. For example, log linearly detrended version of the index shows larger
global economic slowdown than the same indicator taken in growth rate.
Figure 2.9 depicts the impulse response function of crude oil risk premium
constructed under two different contemporaneous structural matrices.
Specifically, matrix 2.9 refers to the benchmark model and it takes into account
the real economic activity index. Instead, matrix 2.10 includes the industrial
production index and implies a positive impact response of risk premium to
aggregate demand shocks. The effect of this shock is only temporarily and the
impulse response of risk premium becomes negative after few periods.
Overall, the empirical response estimates of risk premium and real price of
oil obtained from matrix 2.10 exhibit striking qualitative similarities with the
empirical response estimates of the benchmark model.
Finally, figure 2.11 depicts the historical decomposition of crude oil risk pre-
mium, for the benchmark model (black line) and the alternative specification
including the industrial production index (red line). We have shown that the
average behaviour of the endogenous variables are robust to changes in the
proxy for global real economic activity. In contrast, in case of the historical
decomposition of crude oil risk premium, we highlight some differences that can
be mainly attributed to the specific measures of economic activity. According
to the SVAR model including the industrial production index (top-left corner
of figure 2.11 ) the decline in actual risk premium rp4t+3 between 2005 and mid
2008 was mainly driven by cumulative effects of negative supply shocks (red
cp,wip = 2.1 to get cq,wip = 0.7.
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line). The latter played an important role in driving up the risk premium over
the last period. Finally, the role of aggregate demand shocks behind the recent
drop in oil prices (and hence increase in the risk premium) is negligible (red
line) compared to the same effect implied by the benchmark model with real
economic activity index (black line). As regards the importance of the risk
premium shocks, both specifications agree that residual shocks have not been
relevant in driving the risk premium estimates (bottom-right corner of figure
2.11) over the period of interest.
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2.7 Conclusions
The benefit of including oil futures contracts as an asset of financial invest-
ment portfolio is widely accepted in both the academic literature and the oil
industry.
Crude oil futures contracts allow investors to get more attractive portfolio’s
diversification with a higher ratio of return to risk than traditional investments
made of equities and bonds, only.
Therefore if the current futures price is below the expected future spot price,
arbitrage mechanism implies convergence of the futures price to the spot price
at maturity and this turns into positive excess returns.
The expected returns of crude oil futures investment represent simply bets be-
cause spot and roll returns follow an uncertain scenario. However, a possible
way to derive a forward-looking measure of risk premium relies on the impulse
response estimates implied by the SVAR model proposed in this analysis.
Moreover, impulse response analysis suggests the existence of a negative rela-
tionship between the impact responses of the real price of oil and oil futures
risk premium to shocks of the economic fundamentals of the global oil market.
As a consequence investors could exploit these findings as an asset allocation
strategy.
Finally, we highlight that the main economic factors behind the historical
decline of the risk premium can be explained by shocks to aggregate and pre-
cautionary demand for crude oil.
In this way the effects of the financialization of commodity markets on the
risk premium are modelled endogenously with respect to the global market for
crude oil.
Our results suggest that shocks to economic fundamentals play a crucial role
in explaining the path of the oil futures risk premium. They are also more
144
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important than specific shocks to the non-diversifiable component of the long
investors.
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Appendix Chapter 2
2.8 Identification strategy
This section reports a short description of the algorithm proposed by Baumeis-
ter and Hamilton (2015) for the estimation of model 2.4, under a Bayesian per-
spective. The implementation of the estimation algorithm is based on three
main steps.
First stage consists of a specification of informative prior beliefs, represented in
form of density functions about the matrix A, the vector collecting the struc-
tural disturbances vt and the matrix Bj, for j = 1, · · · , 12.
Prior for the elements of the contemporaneous structural matrix that are not
known with certainty are collected in a vector (α). Thus, let p(A) be the joint
prior distribution which is made by the product of Student t distributions of
the elements collected in α. Then, we need to specify priors for the inverse
diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the structural errors D
conditional on A. The priors for d−1ii (which denotes the element in row and
column i of matrix D) conditional on A is given by a Γ(κi, τi) distribution, as
follow:
p(D|A) =
n∏
i=1
p(dii|A) (2.11)
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where κi/τi and κi/τ
2
i represent the first and second moments of d
−1
ii , respec-
tively. Notice that, the parameter τi depends on A whereas ki does not.
Following Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) we calibrate the diagonal elements
of D from the residuals obtained by running ols regressions from the univariate
autoregressive models of order 12. Moreover, we set the prior mean for d−1ii
equals to the reciprocal of the diagonal element of a matrix ASA′, where S
represents the sample variance covariance matrix of the univariate autoregres-
sive models performed for each time-series.
We postulate b˜i is a row vector of random structural coefficients following a
conditional normal multivariate distribution, b˜i|A,D ∼ N (mi, diiMi) where
mi can be interpreted as the best guess about b˜i before seeing the data and Mi
represents the level of uncertainty about the standard Minnesota prior.
We follow the approach proposed by Doan et al. (1984) in which the behaviour
for a generic time-series can be represented by a random walk process with
mi = 0 and great confidence to expect that coefficients related to higher lags
are zero. 7
In the end, the joint probability distribution of the prior information about
the plausible values of the parameters is defined as:
p(A,D,Bj) = p(A)p(D|A)p(Bj|A,D) for j = 1, 2, ..., 24 (2.12)
In the second step, the Baumeister and Hamilton (2015)’s algorithm searches
for a vector of values αˆ that solves numerically a maximization problem of the
target function q(α). Thus, the vector αˆ provides a reasonable guess for the
7Following Baumeister and Hamilton (2017) we need to set three different values for the
hyper-parameters of the random walk prior for the lagged coefficients. Thus, we set the
parameter controlling the overall tightness of the prior to 0.5. We set the parameter that
governs how quickly the prior for lagged coefficients tightness to zero as lag increase to 1.
Finally, we put prior on the parameter governing the tightness of the prior for the constant
term to 100. The latter is used to make the prior on the constant term irrelevant.
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posterior mean of α while the matrix of second derivatives of q(α) with respect
to α = αˆ exploits information about the shape of the posterior distribution of
α.
In other words, the second stage sets the initial values for the elements of A
in order to inform the random-walk Metropolis Hasting algorithm, that is per-
formed in the third step.
The last stage is designed to construct the joint posterior distribution of the
parameters, that is p(A,D,B|YT ), where YT represents the sample-data. Ac-
cording to Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) we proceed as follow.
First, we use the Metropolis Hasting algorithm to generate draws from the pos-
terior distribution of the contemporaneous structural matrix, that is p(A|YT ).
The iteration starts setting α1 = αˆ and for a generic step l + 1 we generate
a candidate α˜(l+1) as a sum of αl and the product between three components:
(1) a vector of independent standard student t variables with 2 degrees of
freedom, (2) a scalar tuning parameter for 30% acceptance ratio and (3) the
Cholesky factorization of the matrix capturing the curvature of the posterior
distribution of the vector of unknowns parameters A.
Then, we compare the value of the target function evaluated in α˜(l+1) and
α(l), respectively. If q(α˜(l+1)) < q(α(l)), we set α(l+1) = α(l) with probability
1− exp[q(α˜(l+1)− q(α(l+1))]; otherwise we set α(l+1) = α˜(l+1). The value l indi-
cates the number of iterations with the first D burn-in draws included. Thus,
starting with l = D + 1, for each αl we generate δlii ∼ Γ(k∗i , τ ∗i (A(αl))) for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and take Dl to be diagonal matrix whose elements dlii = 1/δ
l
ii.
Finally, from the posterior distribution of the variance covariance matrix of
the structural error terms we can further generate b˜li ∼ N (m∗i , dliiM∗i ) for
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, where b˜li is the row vector of lagged structural parameters re-
ferred to the ith variable.
155
2. Conclusion
In the end, the triple {A(αl), Dl, Bl}D+Nl=D+1 represents a sample size N of pos-
terior distribution:
p(A,D,B|YT ) = p(A|YT )p(D|A, YT )p(B|A,D, YT )) (2.13)
with the first D burn-in draws equals to 200.000 and N = 200.000.
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Conclusions
Identifying and understanding the economic fundamentals behind changes
in the price of oil is not a simple endeavour.
On the basis of the theory of storage, traditional oil market VAR models in-
clude a proxy for global petroleum inventories. This represents a physical
measure that plays a crucial role in identifying speculation activities in the
physical market for crude oil.
In addition, standard arbitrage assumptions provide an equilibrium between
the two markets even if a measure of the forward market is not explicitly in-
cluded in the analysis. As a result, if a speculative purchase drives the oil
futures price up, the arbitrage mechanism ensures that oil traders buy inven-
tories in the physical market, causing the spot price of oil to rise. Most VAR
models existent in the literature, do not support the role of speculation in
driving oil prices during the financialization of commodity markets. There-
fore, the first chapter of my dissertation sheds light new on evidence regarding
this subject.
Following the theory of storage, I highlight the advantages and roles played by
the oil futures-spot spread -as an alternative measure of the proxy for global oil
inventories- to infer the forward-looking expectations of oil traders. In other
words, I provide an economic meaning for the residual structural shock which
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is able to capture the effects of the oil price speculation that is driven by fi-
nancial incentives to keep oil off the physical market.
As a result, the speculation that has been identified by oil market VAR mod-
els specified a’ la Kilian and Murphy are conceptually different from this new
shock, called financial market shock. While both shocks are designed to capture
an instantaneous increase in the amount of oil stocks for future consumption,
the main difference stems from the value of holding oil inventories.
In the first case, the inventories’ build-up is explained by an increase in the
demand for storage. This causes an instantaneous reduction of the oil futures-
spot spread, which is mainly driven by a rise in the convenience yield. In the
second case, the accumulation of crude oil inventories causes an increase in the
oil futures-spot spread which is mainly explained by a decline in the conve-
nience yield.
The main results from the model proposed in the first chapter provides empir-
ical evidence that financial market shocks have contributed to explain the rise
in the price of oil during the financialization of commodity markets. However,
in explaining the sharp rise in the price of oil, I found that shocks to the aggre-
gate demand remain the main important drivers in accordance with previous
studies.
Another important topic consists of the impact of oil price shocks on economic
and financial indicators. In particular, in the second chapter I investigate the
connection between unexpected changes in the global price of oil and oil fu-
tures risk premium estimates.
Impulse response analysis suggests the existence of a negative relationship be-
tween the impact responses of the price of oil and of the oil risk premium to
shocks of the economic fundamentals in the global market.
The results show that the crude oil risk premium responds to oil price shocks
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differently, depending on the causes behind the shocks. In particular, the re-
sponse of the crude oil risk premium to demand shocks is greater than the
supply shocks.
As a consequence, investors could exploit these findings as an assets allocation
strategy. Thus, in order to define a proper set of forward-looking efficient fron-
tiers, oil speculators should combine assets’ weight and expected return at the
net of the risk premium reduction, as documented in this analysis.
Moreover, it is important to note that the decline of the risk premium might
be reinforced by a reduction in the short-hedging demand of commercial firms.
Although every hedging strategy implies an off-setting gain between spot and
financial markets, it is well known that higher levels of oil prices might lead
to a reduction of the incentive to hedge against price drops. This is motivated
by a higher return than hedgers would receive if they did not hedge.
Other interesting results refer to the effects of a positive risk premium shock
on the set of endogenous variables.
The first piece of evidence is that the oil risk premium is the only variable to
increase in response to positive risk premium shocks. Other macroeconomic
and global oil market variables are not simultaneously affected by the risk pre-
mium shock, according to the identification structure implied by the model.
For this reason, risk premium shocks are not driven by economic fundamentals,
as is typical of the global market for crude oil.
Beyond the impact period, an unanticipated positive risk premium shock might
cause a rise in the cost of hedging for commercial firms and an increase in the
price of oil. It is important to point out that this result does not hold for every
risk premium estimate. Therefore, we conclude that upon the impact period
the effects of positive risk premium shocks on the real price of oil is mixed.
Last but not least, this paper provides results in terms of the historical de-
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composition of the crude oil risk premium. There is empirical evidence that
shocks to the aggregate demand represent the main economic factors behind
the decline of the oil futures risk premium. This implies that, economic fun-
damentals represent the rational drivers behind any investment strategy taken
on by speculators, with direct impact on the aggregate measure for crude oil
risk premium. It is important to point out that, this finding is still consistent
with the claim that the growth of commodity index investments have caused
a reduction in the crude oil risk premium.
In general, my dissertation expands current empirical literature on two fields
regarding the global market for crude oil. The first refers to modelling the price
of oil, while the second consists of the impact of oil price shocks on economic
indicators.
The goal of research in the first field is to identify the aggregate contribu-
tion of the main economic and financial factors behind changes in the price
of crude oil. Given the complexity of the issue, this analysis could lead to
further investigation along two main lines: (1) the type of variables and (2)
the methodology used for the empirical analysis.
As regards the first issue, researchers should find alternative variables to cap-
ture the forward looking expectations of oil traders. In this work I introduce a
proxy for the convenience yield that derives from the futures market but is not
the only measure available. One might decide to use other derivative contracts
to infer a forward-looking measure.
Moreover, I think that the interaction between oil futures prices and changes in
crude oil inventories deserve further investigation. Recently, “the financial and
physical oil markets linkages” was the main topic discussed in the workshop
organized by the EIA.
The empirical work proposed by Miao et al. (2017) provide an important contri-
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bution to the investigation of the impact of crude oil inventory announcements
on derivative prices. The authors state that: oil futures and options prices re-
spond in a manner that seems to “correctly” anticipate changes in oil inventory
levels - anticipatory trading apparently prevails -. It should be interesting to
conduct an analogous investigation by taking into account the endogeneity of
the variables.
The second issue refers to the econometric framework used to carry on the em-
pirical analysis. I suggest adopting a factor-augmented VAR model (FAVAR),
as discussed in Juvenal and Petrella (2015), because an analysis based on panel-
data, economic factors and a proper identification scheme might improve the
accuracy of the results.
The second chapter of the thesis investigates the role of the oil futures risk
premium in the international market for crude oil. This analysis emphasises
the importance of the risk premium for two main reasons. First, it represents
the opportunity cost that is accrued to commercial firms for hedging purposes.
Second, it is an attractive investment return for oil speculators. This is moti-
vated by the inflow of capital into crude oil futures markets from commodity
index traders. The latter are economic agents who wish to gain exposure to
the oil futures price without holding the commodity in the physical market.
This analysis suggests a number of avenues for future research.
First, since the risk premium is not observable, more advanced models should
be adopted for its estimation. For example, a new class of financial models
called “unspanned macroeconomic factor models” should be introduced to this
field. Basically, they are linear affine term structure models that are similar to
those proposed by Casassus and Collin Dufresne (2006) and Hamilton and Wu
(2014) except for the role played by the economic activity in explaining the
risk premium. In fact, linear affine term structure models suffer from several
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limitations due to the “spanning hypothesis”. This implies that all relevant
information of the economy is spanned, that is reflected by the current futures
price. As a consequence, further information from the business cycle does not
contribute significantly to improve the forecasting accuracy of the oil futures
price and the implied risk premium.
As opposed to these methodologies, results from unspanned models that ex-
plicitly link the real economic activity with the oil financial markets help to
improve forecasts of oil futures prices, like in Alquist et al. (2014) and Heath
(2016).
Another way to retrieve reliable risk premium estimates is to adopt a fore-
casting combination approach. In its simplest form, this method consists of
a weighted average of risk premium estimates which are derived from a com-
bination of different econometric approaches, like the above mentioned risk
premium regression and unspanned models.
Finally, this analysis, along with other recent research, suggests that inter-
preting the role of the risk premium requires the identification of the channels
through which oil shocks can affect the economy. Since recent studies by Hamil-
ton and Wu (2012, 2014) have documented an increase in the volatility of the
oil futures risk premium, the empirical literature should focus on SVAR mod-
els, identified via heteroskedasticity. Alternatively, researchers might propose
other advanced approaches that take into account the shifts in the regimes of
the stochastic process driving endogenous variables, as the Markov switching
VAR models do.
162
